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Fisker Karma

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Fisker Failure

I was doing some more research in what was happening at Fisker and it seems the main reason why Henrik left is he didn't want to continue trying to draw down the rest of the DOE loan (instead he advocated slimming down the company in order to build the Atlantic with a smaller budget), while the new CEO Posawatz wanted to continue pursuing the loan.
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/19/us-autos-fisker-idUSBRE92I04M20130319


I'm trying to figure out when they started to fail. They stopped production in July, but according to them it's because of a summer holiday at the factory. Looking back it seems the biggest blow to the company was the CR review in March 2012 where it broke down (CR also gave it the worst rating out of all luxury sedans), then of course the A123 battery recall shortly after. And since they have worked through their pre-orders already they really had no sales to rely on to carry them through. I'm not sure even if they got new investors, how they would turn the ship around in terms of the Karma. Their only plausible bet was the Atlantic.
 
Continue to draw down the rest of the DOE loan in other words mean to continue to build and invest in Fisker's own factory. Like Tesla did.
Giving up on a loan and running slim is equal to continuation of reliance on third party contractors for production and probably for big part of development.

While it is hard to say which one is better, in my opinion the fundamental Fisker problem is poor execution. By the August '12 Tesla finished Roadster program and sold almost all cars to end customers. Plus had not only plant, but most investments made into supply chain tooling to start production of MS. Accumulated Tesla deficit at that time was IIRC $850M. In comparison Fisker by the same point of time managed to raise more money then Tesla($1.2B) and had bigger accumulated net loss. Fisker managed to produce ~2000 Karmas, all sold to dealers but most were still waiting to be actually sold to customers. And Fisker plant were nothing but an empty place with walls. As for an Atlantic - no investments in tooling (factory or supply chain) were made.

So depends on how you evaluate plant and supply chain of Tesla, Fisker Automotive managed to spend $300M-$500M more while got much less actual sales and no production base of their own.
 
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I'm trying to figure out when they started to fail. They stopped production in July, but according to them it's because of a summer holiday at the factory. Looking back it seems the biggest blow to the company was the CR review in March 2012 where it broke down (CR also gave it the worst rating out of all luxury sedans), then of course the A123 battery recall shortly after. And since they have worked through their pre-orders already they really had no sales to rely on to carry them through. I'm not sure even if they got new investors, how they would turn the ship around in terms of the Karma. Their only plausible bet was the Atlantic.

The Karma just wasn't a well-planned product. It was too contradictory: a big sedan with tiny interior; high performance claims but heavy and sluggish given its powertrain. Execution was poor as well. Many review articles about the Karma drive experience showed that the electronic user interfaces were very buggy.

There's just not much market for a car like the Karma. If they had built the Atlantic first and gotten it right, I think Fisker would still be healthy, instead of looking for a buyer now. A car that has more space, performance, and luxury than a Chevy Volt would have had a market.
 
.... If they had built the Atlantic first and gotten it right, I think Fisker would still be healthy, instead of looking for a buyer now. A car that has more space, performance, and luxury than a Chevy Volt would have had a market.

The Atlantic still suffers from the giant battery down the middle. Storage in the trunk may be equally tiny. Even if done right it's success could still be questionable.
 
To illustrate these 90kW, let me have a look at power generated by regenerative braking, either by decelerating or by going down a hill.

deceleration power P = m v a where m = vehicle mass, v = velocity, and a = (negative) acceleration

I use SI units here: m=2400kg, a is given as 2.5m/s² resolve for v = P / m a = 15 m/s = 54 km/h (kph) = 34 mph

To max out 90kW regenerative power, you must decelerate a Karma starting at 34mph with 0.25g. But after 6s you are at a full stop, and deceleration power has fallen in a linear way to zero.


Power going downhill
is P = m g dh/dt where g = earth acceleration 9.81m/s² , and dh/dt = loss of altitude per second. Solving for dh/dt = P / m g = 3.8 m/s.
To achieve this, you would have to head down a 12% slope by 31.7m/s = 114km/h (kph) = 71mph. So, somewhere between reckless and insane :redface:

Both calculations ignore losses to rolling resistance and aerodynamic drag. You would have to go even faster to achieve the 90kW when including these.

So while it seems possible to get 90kW of regen in a Karma for a short time, I deem it hard to sustain that for such a long time that you see several % SoC added to the battery.
And of course you can charge a Karma to full going downhill, but just not all the time at 90kW.
 
Fisker Is Bleeding Itself To Death

Fisker Is Bleeding Itself To Death

I met Tony Posawatz at 2009 LA Auto Show (Chevy booth, Volt) on Media Day

http://2009laautoshow.blogspot.com/2009/12/m-eberhard-chevrolet-booth-09-la-auto.html

[ where I met Martin Eberhard. Bob Lutz was there too, but had to leave suddenly (crisis in GM leadership) ]

who knew Martin E.

Fisker had a booth, & I clearly remember a former Chrysler exec tell me that "Fisker would never make it"

http://2009laautoshow.blogspot.com/2009/12/john-savickaspvic-concourse-hall-09-la.html

Tesla Motors had a number of crises (nearly closed down in Xmas 2008, down to 10 million cash), but recovered.

darwin.jpg


"It's not the strongest of the species that survives, nor the most intelligent that survives. It is the one most adaptable to [ environmental ] change"
-- Charles Darwin
 
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Good article on "Risk Management" about Dr Ken Atkins (UIUC PhD Aerospace Eng, my Dad was Prof & Dept Head).

http://askmagazine.nasa.gov/pdf/pdf14/61608main_14_stardust_atkins.pdf

UIUC produced 3 Space Shuttle astronauts

[ all with military backgrounds like Dr Atkins, he was with SAC Vietnam 1958 - 1966, I assume flying B52 bombing runs. Steve Nagel, Joe Archambault, Scott Altman (commander for both Hubble repair missions) ]

& had a rich collaboration/partnership with Caltech/JPL via my Dad. The Mars Rover missions (incl the recent MSL Mars Science Laboratory) had some key contributions fro UIUC alumni, students & faculty.

He hired 3 Caltech Aerospace Eng PhDs for his Dept, since his mentor was Dr Bruce Hicks (Caltech PhD..advisor was Nobelist Linus Pauling) who co-founded CFD (Computational Fluid Dynamics) at UIUC, which my Dad took over.

[ CFD (aka "wind tunnel on a computer" is a key Technology for Indycar, Formula 1, NASCAR...Motorsports. Something EVERY car company (Audi, Ferrari, Toyota, Porsche, Nissan, et al) are involved as a Durability/Reliability test-bed. Also designing aerodynamically slippery (drag coefficient) production cars. My Dad hired a wind-tunnel aerodynamicist Dr Michael Selig, who later consulted for Newman-Haas Racing (Indycar): 3 wins in 6 races for Michael Andretti. I currently have an Indycar project I'm working on

Martin forgot to lookup his old UIUC friends for Tesla Motors, since NCSA (National Ctr for Supercomputing Applications..UIUC/Cornell/UCSD/Minnesota) could have been brought in to help with the Roadster "drag coefficient". NCSA was founded by UIUC astronomer Dr Larry Smarr (in adjoining building ACP, Advanced Computation Building), who even visited our Coordinated Science Lab, where Martin & myself were at. The most famous NCSA spinoff is NCSA Mosaic (Marc Andreesen of Netscape fame) & Spyglass Technology (Internet Explorer which was bought by Microsoft) ]

You will recall that Caltech engineers Alan Cocconi & Wally Rippel did their pioneering work in development of General Motors EV1 prototype at Aerovironment (founded by legendary Caltech Aeronautics PhD Dr Paul Macready). Martin Eberhard later SAVED Alan's company (AC Propulsion) during his quest for an "electric sports car", whose PEM (Power Electronics Module) was licensed for the Tesla Roadster. He got a referral to Elon Musk/SpaceX from ACP (after they wouldn't take their TZero prototype into a production car)

"there's this guy Elon Musk who is talking about the same thing like you..production of EV"

which setup that pivotal meeting at SpaceX between Elon & Martin, that resulted in the initial funding for Tesla Motors (40 million)

[ Incidentally, my dad was at Coordinated Science Lab (3rd floor), while mysef/Martin/Steve Cross (former Vice President Georgia-Tech & President GTRI..GaTech Research Inst) were on 2nd floor..AARG (Advanced Automation Research Group) = Robotics/Computer Vision/Artificial Intelligence, the CORE Technology for Autonomous Vehicle Navigation ("robot cars"), e.g. Google Car ]

The above is an example of "Innovation Ecosystem" (term used by Judy Estrin, who worked with Martin E on his previous startups & was recruited to Tesla Motors BoD, who left during the early 2008 "Tesla bloodbath" along with Wally Rippel)

Closing the Innovation Gap by Judy Estrin

how leading Univs produce KEY people in Tech. It's NO ACCIDENT that you see the "convergence" of UIUC & Caltech engineers (Electrical Engineering & Aeronautics), there is a long history of cooperation/partnership between these 2 Univs:

1) Thomas Everhart (UIUC Chancellor) became Caltech President (1987 - 1997)
his name appeared in "Who Killed the Electric Car", in a negative sense. More info at Caltech Oral Histories.

2) JPL Director (Lew Allen 1982 - 1990) was a UIUC PhD Physics & 4-star General

The glaring thing about Tesla Motors, is that the UIUC & Caltech component is GONE (Martin & Wally Rippel casualties in "bloodbath") The standout at Tesla is the CTO JB Straubel (Stanford Engineering alumni)

"It's all about [ quality ] PEOPLE"
-- XX, DoD (Dept of Defense) consultant, "How to win Wars"

Needs effective leaders & engineers. Which is the evaluation meter for Tesla Motors & Fisker.


With above as perspective (Fisker impending doom, Tesla Motors "adaptation"), here is the bottomline:

LESSONS
• Effective budget planning considers not only how
much money a project requires, but also when the
money is needed.


• Many times, project success isn’t the result of not
making mistakes; it’s the result of having the courage to
face mistakes head on and take action.

It's the same lessons as in Motorsports:

"ability to deal with ADVERSITY"

I.e., it won't be a perfect ride..there will be bumps in the road (crashes, lap-traffic, equipment problems, etc).

"Life is 20% what happens to you, 80% HOW YOU RESPOND TO IT"

Here is another good sequence:

That’s when I learned that it’s one thing to put the
money together. It’s another thing to put it into all the
right buckets, and it’s an even more crucial thing to get
it out in a timely fashion. As we worked through the
problem with LMA, our contractor, it was clear we had
been overly optimistic in how much time their subcon*
tractor, Motorola, would need to prepare a new contract
for the transponders. We also discovered that another
LMA project already had a contract in place for the same
transponders we needed to buy. If we could act quickly
we could simply “add” our units to that contract, but we
needed about $11 to $13 million immediately

...

Stardust was successfully launched on February 7,
1999. It has been flying extremely well, and has spent
quite a bit of time with its collector exposed to the
stardust mentioned early on in this story. It’s on its way,
hopefully, to a successful fly-through with the comet in
January 2004—and a return to earth in 2006 with both
comet particles and stardust. I was even able to give
money back at the end of the development and launch
phase of the project, almost a million dollars.
This thing about cash flow is something that I’m
now preaching to all the proposal teams in my current
role as a review board member. At the beginning of a
project, cash flow is king. The reason I had this screwup was because I had looked at my overall budget and
said, “We can do this.” I was inexperienced, and I didn’t
see cash flow as an issue.
I started this story by talking about my days of
excitement in the Air Force. I’ll finish by talking about
times of leisure now in my semi-retirement. I’ve played a
lot of golf during my life, but I never took any lessons. So,
frustration with my game and results has a long history.
Just recently, I faced the fact that I had no clue as to
what I was doing wrong. I went out and hired a pro to
help me. At the first lesson, he said, “Here’s how your
grip needs to be.” And he went through a lot of other
things, but the bottom line was, “If you don’t set up
correctly, you can’t hit the shot.” You can imagine how
that line struck home!
And this is what’s key to the story I just told about
Stardust. If you don’t have that cash flow set up correctly
along with the budget and the schedule, you can’t “hit
the shot” and you’re going to be in trouble.
 
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I'm trying to figure out when they started to fail. They stopped production in July, but according to them it's because of a summer holiday at the factory. Looking back it seems the biggest blow to the company was the CR review in March 2012 where it broke down (CR also gave it the worst rating out of all luxury sedans), then of course the A123 battery recall shortly after. And since they have worked through their pre-orders already they really had no sales to rely on to carry them through. I'm not sure even if they got new investors, how they would turn the ship around in terms of the Karma. Their only plausible bet was the Atlantic.

With hindsight (and foresight in some cases) Fisker made a lot of mistakes. I would say their first mistake was choosing Quantum Technologies as a drivetrain partner. The first time I became aware of Quantum was when they were working on H2 ICE vehicles at a time when the Bush admin was pouring a lot of dough into hydrogen. I was never impressed with them and was rather surprised Fisker had chosen them. My guess is Henrik was sold on and expected a near turn-key drivetrain solution. That clearly wasn't the case. If you're starting a "green" car company, the primary focus should be the drivetrain.

But I think Fisker's main mistake, after years of delay without any transparency, was launching with a car that had some critical bugs and severely missed performance and reliability expectations. The poor CR review was a result of that. Why they shipped the car when they did, I don't know, but it clearly wasn't ready. They gave a car to Motor Trend as a contender for 2012 COTY and MT couldn't even evaluate it. Boggles the mind.

Probably if they better communicated with their customers to manage performance and delivery expectations, and then launched with the car they had in ~ May 2012, they would have had a better chance of success.
 
Perhaps more insight on Henrik's departure.

Fisker Is Bleeding Itself To Death

“My ethics told me I had to leave. I had to follow ethical standards. I still love the company. It was my life.” Henrik Fisker sounded angry about what had been going on, but he refused to say much beyond that by way of specifics. What is clear, though, is that past few months have been rougher for the company that bears his name, Fisker Automotive, than at any point in its brief history.The company isn’t completely dead, not yet anyway, but Henrik already speaks in the past tense.

“Despite all the difficulties, I think most people will remember the company for what it did.”

I wonder what decisions are being made that he deems unethical.
 
They didn't deliver what they promised.

Simple as that.

I am a former Fisker reservation holder and now P85 owner.

I put a deposit on the Fisker back in 2008.

They promised 100 mpg, sub 5 sec 0-60, $75k and 70+ miles on battery.


They failed on every single promise.


After my test drive I cancelled my reservation and ordered the S.
 
With hindsight (and foresight in some cases) Fisker made a lot of mistakes. I would say their first mistake was choosing Quantum Technologies as a drivetrain partner. The first time I became aware of Quantum was when they were working on H2 ICE vehicles at a time when the Bush admin was pouring a lot of dough into hydrogen. I was never impressed with them and was rather surprised Fisker had chosen them. My guess is Henrik was sold on and expected a near turn-key drivetrain solution. That clearly wasn't the case. If you're starting a "green" car company, the primary focus should be the drivetrain.

But I think Fisker's main mistake, after years of delay without any transparency, was launching with a car that had some critical bugs and severely missed performance and reliability expectations. The poor CR review was a result of that. Why they shipped the car when they did, I don't know, but it clearly wasn't ready. They gave a car to Motor Trend as a contender for 2012 COTY and MT couldn't even evaluate it. Boggles the mind.

Probably if they better communicated with their customers to manage performance and delivery expectations, and then launched with the car they had in ~ May 2012, they would have had a better chance of success.

It's quite entertaining reading some of the comments now:

The tesla sedan is all smoke and mirrors. You don't see a running model to test because there is nothing to test. The promise of tesla model S's produced and sold is a pipe dream. The tesla roadster platform was a purchased unit from lotus not a car designed by tesla. Now that platform is out of production at lotus. Have you seen a succeding roadster from tesla, no. I suspect they lack the developing $$ to up date the roadster. $$ and developing engineering for a new model 4-door sedan and bring it fully sorted to market is not happening. If you are waiting for a 4-door model S Tesla to arrive get usedto disappointment
 
Fisker latched onto the green tech movement without really having a fundamental mission to back it up. The Karma, replete with "environmentally conscious" materials used in its interior, is a bloated inefficient vehicle posing as an Earth-saver. Its locomotive-style drivetrain is further proof that locomotives don't scale downward very well, and the battery fires show a further lack of engineering and testing. Actually, Hurricane Sandy did a nice job of illustrating Fisker's engineering consistency!
 
the car does not excel at anything

its HEAVY 5300 lbs dry
its slow, 0-60 in 6+ seconds is a joke when the car costs well over $110K
it has terrible range (again way too heavy)
the interior is not high quality, the leather is mediocre, the fit and finish is terrible for a high end luxury car
the solar panel on the top is ridiculous being only 120W an costing $5000, in one you tube video the guy calculated in order for the sunroof to make any difference you would have to own the car for 500 years
the command center (interface/touchscreen) is horrible
it has caught on fire multiple times (real bad for PR)
the tires don't last long at all (again too heavy and freaking expensive due to the)


there is a couple upsides to owning a fisker, it rides nice, it looks nice, and well thats about it.

the only reason why anyone would own a fisker over a model S is because the fisker was available much sooner (by about a year)
 
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...and the battery fires show a further lack of engineering and testing...

** steps onto soapbox, looks sternly at the audience, slides half-rimmed glasses to edge of nose **

We should all be very conscious of terms used on the forum, so as to avoid misleading a less-informed public. It would only serve to damage the BEV/EREV community even more. Fisker never had "battery fires". Their fire issues stemmed from mechanical issues completely unrelated to the battery.

** remove glasses, slowly step off soapbox **

** steps onto an entirely different soapbox, grabs microphone, clears throat **

Fisker's business plan was the failed model. I believe the car had all the potential to be a phenom, but the execution was very poor, they lacked enough engineering talent to manage their tech without an overt reliance upon suppliers who could not deliver. Perhaps worst of all, the business model had epically poor timing, and their CFO needs a serious course in both basic and automotive business economics. Add a healthy dash of brash arrogance and you have enough TNT to drop a building (or at least destroy a company). They were right to introduce the Karma, but should have communicated better about the price change. They also should have kept the Karma's development a bit better under wraps rather than blitzing the media and promising delivery dates that were outrageously untenable. had they been better at forecasting their delivery dates and developing the Delaware deal, they would have had access to the DOE funding and perhaps been in a better position today. We may never really know why it was so late in introduction, but at some point, they reached their point of no return and just dropped the car into the waiting arms of consumers who had far greater expectations based upon what was originally advertised, and with a car that was far from production ready, despite some areas of fine polish. Some owners brazenly bashed the car, while others maintained a fierce loyalty despite repeated problems and odd ritualistic behaviors to get the car to function "normally".

Of minimal dispute, however, is the need to bring out a car that could help finance the future R&D and keep the company moving forward. Our very own Tesla is employing the same strategy, but with a dramatically different end result. Introducing the Atlantic would have been impossible, given the amount of CAPEX needed to get that project underway. Not sure Tesla is ready for that venture, even today, and that's with overwhelming success in the Model S. They needed to lead with the Karma, but desperately needed good Karma, not bad Karma.