Welcome to Tesla Motors Club
Discuss Tesla's Model S, Model 3, Model X, Model Y, Cybertruck, Roadster and More.
Register

Blind Faith Price Targets

This site may earn commission on affiliate links.
electric boats, tractors, various sorts of utility vehicles (forklifts, actual golf carts, ..), panel/delivery vans, short haul trucks, fleet work vehicles, buses, ferry boats, ..

Transportation is an awful lot bigger than just cars, and some of those applications need an awfully big pile of batteries.


There's a lot of moving of stuff to be done and it is effectively all done by burning fossil fuels today, and needs to eventually be done with stored electrical energy. Lots of growth opportunities somewhere in those supply chains to tap into.
 
Currently, Tesla is trading at $251, and with respect to a s3739.82 long-term price target for the end of 2025, that implies a 29.02% discount. This implied discount is at the 45th percentile for the last twelve months. So we are just a tad below netral sentiment. At this sentiment the BFPT 12 months out is $324, while the min sentiment BFPT is $257. So if you're time horizon is well beyond 12 months, the upside is fair and downside is pretty limited. Personally, I am already quite overweight on the stock, so I am not accumulating at these prices.

Percentile Imp Discount 5/28/20151/15/20165/28/20161/20/2017
45.4529.02%$251$295$324$382
032.19%$194$232$257$308
2530.23%$227$269$296$352
5028.49%$262$307$337$397
7527.47%$285$333$364$426
10025.47%$337$390$424$491

Some people may be interested in how these targets change if you assume a different long-term price target. Our LTPT is 10.603 years away, so while you could replicate the analysis with a different LTPT, I would like to suggest an approximation. It basically comes down to an adjustment to the implied discount rate. I will illustrate with an example.

The LTPT we have assumed is $3739.82. Suppose we believe a $5000 target is more suitable. Let's suppose we want the minimum sentiment 12 months out. The minimum sentiment BFPT for today is $194. So from this to $5000 in 10.603 years is an implied discout of 35.86% = (5000/194)^(1/10.603) - 1. Note that this is a few points higher than our previous implied discount of 32.19%. This is because we are now assuming a higher LTPT. To take this out a year we compute $263.57 = 194×(1 + 0.3586). So are original 12 month min sentiment BFPT was $257, but under the $5000 LTPT we get $264.

While $5000 is substantially larger than $3740, this difference only translates into a $7 difference in our 12 month target. For me personally, this is not a big enough difference to change my investment strategy, so I'm comfortable with making either long-term assumption. I'd encourage people to try their own sensitivity analysis to see if they are comfortable with the assumptions being made. I'd love to hear back what people find.

As always, make your own mistakes and good luck!

Out of curiosity, could you extend this table out (year by year) until the price hits $3739.82?
 
Hi James. Had a chance to read those earlier BFPT posts last night.

Honestly, I got the impression, the BFPT kind of drifted from basically <hey, here's a little metric I came up with, let's see if playing with gets us to something useful> to <so what does my buy/sell indicator tell me to do>. That is, in your original post, I got the sense you were sharing something you were wondering if we might all find a way to evolve into something useful... but it just drifted to being used without examination and refinement.

Maybe I misinterpreted your message, but I got this impression from the very first thing you wrote about the BFPT,

"Sometimes super simple models can get you fairly reasonable results. I'd like to share a price model so simple it may just make you laugh, but let's see if it doesn't lead to something sensible."

I love your contributions here at TMC and I cheer your effort to come up with another tool to gauge the relative attractiveness of buying, selling, holding at the current market price. That said, having looked at the BFPT closely, in it's current form, it is not something I would include in my decisions re TSLA. Obviously, everyone makes their own call, but I did want to share my sense with anyone who might consider using the BFPT, including yourself, that a step kind of got skipped from conception to adoption of the BFPT in investing decisions.

 
  • Love
Reactions: ValueAnalyst
I have a somewhat dumb question. I have a GTC (good till cancelled) order for 20-30% of my TSLA @ $5,000/share, to definately (hopefully keep the shares from being loaned to shorts. Is this a useless exercise? Do I misunderstand GTC (i've been in the market since 1977)
 
I have a somewhat dumb question. I have a GTC (good till cancelled) order for 20-30% of my TSLA @ $5,000/share, to definately (hopefully keep the shares from being loaned to shorts. Is this a useless exercise? Do I misunderstand GTC (i've been in the market since 1977)

Definitely the wrong thread for this question, but I think you need to ask your brokerage what the policy is. I recall this discussion making the rounds a year or so ago, and people were saying that a cash account they could not loan them out, and on a margin account they could? Of course you will never be affected either way, but I gather you are trying to increase the cost for shorters.
 
Definitely the wrong thread for this question, but I think you need to ask your brokerage what the policy is. I recall this discussion making the rounds a year or so ago, and people were saying that a cash account they could not loan them out, and on a margin account they could? Of course you will never be affected either way, but I gather you are trying to increase the cost for shorters.
Yes, that's what I recall, too: unless you've used your TSLA as collateral for margin, or given explicit permission, your broker can't lend out your TSLA shares.
 
Hi James. Had a chance to read those earlier BFPT posts last night.

Honestly, I got the impression, the BFPT kind of drifted from basically <hey, here's a little metric I came up with, let's see if playing with gets us to something useful> to <so what does my buy/sell indicator tell me to do>. That is, in your original post, I got the sense you were sharing something you were wondering if we might all find a way to evolve into something useful... but it just drifted to being used without examination and refinement.

Maybe I misinterpreted your message, but I got this impression from the very first thing you wrote about the BFPT,

"Sometimes super simple models can get you fairly reasonable results. I'd like to share a price model so simple it may just make you laugh, but let's see if it doesn't lead to something sensible."

I love your contributions here at TMC and I cheer your effort to come up with another tool to gauge the relative attractiveness of buying, selling, holding at the current market price. That said, having looked at the BFPT closely, in it's current form, it is not something I would include in my decisions re TSLA. Obviously, everyone makes their own call, but I did want to share my sense with anyone who might consider using the BFPT, including yourself, that a step kind of got skipped from conception to adoption of the BFPT in investing decisions.


Thanks, Steve,

My thinking on this has definitely evolved, and not all of that may be expressed in posts. Part of the process is continuing to look at it over time and trying to figure out how it may be used. Certainly with any sort of trading tool, one wants to balance thinks out with a lot of other information and analysis. I constantly try to think about what does this tool capture and what might it be missing in this moment. That is actually one of the reasons why I like the simplicity so much. It's a simple enough tool that I can understand where the numbers are coming from and how that is not the whole story. Specifically, what the tool does is guage near term prices to the longterm vision. A basic tendency many of us have is to get so focused on near term issues and recent price movements that we miss any sort of long-term perspective. That nearsightedness tends to turn our investing into a trading game where we are constantly trying to figure out if the price is going up or down tomorrow. Personally, I do not think I can win at the trading game. Even so, the longterm prospects with Tesla are really promising, and the more I keep my eye on the longterm value creation, the less anxious I become about short term price fluctuations. Indeed, for a patient investor, having confidence to buy when the stock price is beaten down is extremely helpful. So in practice we'll see how this works. Right now we're just a little under neutral sentiment, so it seems to be a good time just to hold. If the price retreats back below $210 I may buy more, but it is good just to be content in this moment. No need to wish away the next ten years of my life.
 
Tracking long-term progress

I would like to recommend that the BFPT methodology is useful for more than just tracking stock prices. We can also use this framework to assess how Tesla needs to develop its capabilities to achieve its longterm goals. Particularly, we know that Tesla wants to reach $30.375B in revenue in 2019.

How do we know that? The basic plan is $6B revenue in 2015, growing 50% each year thereafter. That's $9B in 2016, $13.5B in 2017, $20.25B in 2018, leading to $30.375B in 2019.

So what capabilities are required to hit $30.375B in 4 years. The backbone to both the auto and stationary storage is Gigafactory capacity. Tesla generates nominally about $1000 revenue per kWh making cars. So if Tesla sold only cars in 2019, it would need 30.375 GWh of gigafactory capacity. By contrast, stationary generates nominally about $250 revenue per kWh. So the mix of auto and stationary sales determines how much revenue per kWh Tesla can make. 2/3 auto, 1/3 stationary generates about $750/kWh; hence, 40.5 GWh (30.375/0.75) is require. Under, this mix the Gigafactory can wait until 2020 to reach nameplate 50 GWh capacity. However, the recent view on stationary is that it may consume 2/3 of battery capacity, leaving 1/3 for auto. At this mix, Tesla generates $500/kWh, and a whopping 60.75 GWh capacity by 2019. If this path is pursued, there are two leading options: expand the Gigafactory to 75 GWh by 2020, or build Gigafactory 2 quickly enough to have about 12 GWh capacity in 2019. Quite possibly both paths need to be pursued for greater assurance of timely success and because Gigafactory 2 is absolutely needed by 2020.

So how does this help us as investors? We need to have clear expectation that Gigafactory 2 must start building within 3 years if the stationary business is to be pursued with gusto. Failure to set out a timely plan for this expansion would be a signal that Tesla is not prepared for the longterm growth envisioned in the BFPT. So we see that faith is not so blind. Concrete steps must be take to make the vision a reality. We can work backwards in this manner to derive other capabilities that must be developed in a timely manner. I'd encourage us to think through these issues.

Suddenly the Gigafactory does not look so big.
 
I would like to recommend that the BFPT methodology is useful for more than just tracking stock prices. We can also use this framework to assess how Tesla needs to develop its capabilities to achieve its longterm goals. Particularly, we know that Tesla wants to reach $30.375B in revenue in 2019.

How do we know that? The basic plan is $6B revenue in 2015, growing 50% each year thereafter. That's $9B in 2016, $13.5B in 2017, $20.25B in 2018, leading to $30.375B in 2019.

So what capabilities are required to hit $30.375B in 4 years. The backbone to both the auto and stationary storage is Gigafactory capacity. Tesla generates nominally about $1000 revenue per kWh making cars. So if Tesla sold only cars in 2019, it would need 30.375 GWh of gigafactory capacity. By contrast, stationary generates nominally about $250 revenue per kWh. So the mix of auto and stationary sales determines how much revenue per kWh Tesla can make. 2/3 auto, 1/3 stationary generates about $750/kWh; hence, 40.5 GWh (30.375/0.75) is require. Under, this mix the Gigafactory can wait until 2020 to reach nameplate 50 GWh capacity. However, the recent view on stationary is that it may consume 2/3 of battery capacity, leaving 1/3 for auto. At this mix, Tesla generates $500/kWh, and a whopping 60.75 GWh capacity by 2019. If this path is pursued, there are two leading options: expand the Gigafactory to 75 GWh by 2020, or build Gigafactory 2 quickly enough to have about 12 GWh capacity in 2019. Quite possibly both paths need to be pursued for greater assurance of timely success and because Gigafactory 2 is absolutely needed by 2020.

So how does this help us as investors? We need to have clear expectation that Gigafactory 2 must start building within 3 years if the stationary business is to be pursued with gusto. Failure to set out a timely plan for this expansion would be a signal that Tesla is not prepared for the longterm growth envisioned in the BFPT. So we see that faith is not so blind. Concrete steps must be take to make the vision a reality. We can work backwards in this manner to derive other capabilities that must be developed in a timely manner. I'd encourage us to think through these issues.

Suddenly the Gigafactory does not look so big.

James I can certainly see why looking at where TSLA's current price is relative to its 52 week high and lows has some value. I can also see where Elon Musk's pattern of sharing long-term quantitative descriptions of his vision of Tesla are extremely helpful, even in cases like the Apple market cap comment where he explicitly clarified that this was not guidance (indeed, it led to my raising my estimates in my model, and increasing my valuation of the shares, but not to my assuming the numbers Elon shared. In fact, I started a thread within days to analyze whether Elon's goals were possible, and discuss what it would take to reach them).

All that said, clearly you want to make your trading decisions on the best possible tools, and I think there's an alternative to addressing the shortcoming you described as a motive in your constructing the BFPT.

In your first post on the BFPT (#2400 in the Long Term thread) you wrote,

"It's a matter of fitting model parameters to market prices, something which fundamental analysts almost never do. But truly it is the market that determines the discount rate, and analysts are foolish to think they know better how the market values future earnings from any source."

I do some discounting in the tool I use, but I do not see that as having the shortcoming you suggest.

I'll give a brief summary of how I make my estimate of Tesla so you can see my discounting in context. Here's what I do:

1. Construct bear, bull, and base case volume scenarios and corresponding earnings for 2020 and 2025 (now mostly I focus on 2025 for updates, as 2020 doesn't move around nearly as much).

2. Assign a probability to each scenario.

3. Calculate a weighted average of my expected scenarios.

These steps above are my way of accounting for the unknown of level of Tesla's future success, so as I understand it, this is where an aspect of discounting, discounting for risk in Tesla's execution, resides in my method.

4. Discounting for time value of money/risk of my imperfect forecasting. Based on the size of my Tesla position, the alternative investment options I have, and my level of confidence in my estimating the probable future returns for both, I've decided that as long as I see Tesla returning 14% or better annually, I have no interest in reducing my core Tesla position.

This is a discounting based on the level of expected returns I find warranting the size of my position in Tesla. It has nothing to do with what other market participants have got right, wrong, or are ignoring (i.e. swing traders, those using TA, those just reacting to the latest headline, etc) about Tesla's likelihood of reaching their publicly stated goals.

5. Using that discount I can estimate what my model sees as current fair value.

6. When Tesla is 25-30% below my fair value number, I add on trading shares in increments. I've added trading shares many times, and used up nearly all the money I'd put into trading quite close to the lows from the "f*res" and the recent selloff this winter. If it got 25-30% above fair value, I would consider decreasing my core position (it got close to, but did not reach this level at it's $290 peak last year). Fwiw, I've used this a couple years, and shared it on TMC about two years ago.

James, I'd say the biggest singular influence on my investing has been Warren Buffett. Buffett's mentor, Benjamin Graham, said

“In the short run, the market is a voting machine but in the long run, it is a weighing machine.”

I think the tool I'm using is aimed at keeping a steady focus on the weighing machine's number, and merely seeing the voting machine as a potential opening ("Mr. Market" as Buffett would call it) to buy, sell, or hold trading or core shares. Using a weighing machine I've had very little concern over the past couple of years with Tesla's volatility, both when the stock got ahead of itself, and when it was oversold. In fact, on multiple occasions, big sell offs have led to very nice trading profits. In fact, I used this method quite effectively for years with the other individual stock in my lifetime that I took a large position in, one, whose volatility made TSLA look like a blue chip, and which over 8 years provided terrific returns on my core position.

I really think the best and only way to make investment decisions is based on the relative current disparity of the voting and weighing machine. If you agree with me about this, I'll leave it to you to evaluate whether the BFPT does this.
 
Last edited:
SolarCity: Long-Term Price Target

Many people have asked if I might develop BFPT for SolarCity. Indeed, I've done this for my own use but have been uncomfortable with just how to set the longterm target. So in this post I would like to set out my current thinking on a suitable LTPT and let people react to it and provide feed back.

Think the longterm value of SolarCity should be based on Gross Retained Value. GRV is the NPV of contracts SolarCity has with its customers, using a 6% discount. It is the single largest asset that SolarCity posseses, and it is an income producing asset. Even if SolarCity were to stop installing new systems today, this asset would produce inome for the next 30 years.

It is an enterprise value metric and includes finafinan leverage. There is an unleavened version, net retained value, which backs out cast to cover debt. I have debated in my own mind whether to use GRV or NRV. My inclination is to see financing being used primarily to accelerate grow, not as something intrinsic to the value that SolarCity is creating. Well off in the future when the business is throwing off cash faster than it needs to grow, then SolarCity may well use less leverage. Thus, over time, I think GRV will be more indicative of the value created for sharholders.

As of last quarter, SolarCity has 218k customers and $3,074M GRV. By mid 2018, they target 1 million customers, whence GRV should be $14,101M. Thereafter, I see the growth rate slowing from 90% to 50% for the next 7.5 years. This leads to GRV of $295B by the end of 2025. I also believe that the market cap could be at a ratio of 1 to GRV at that time. Presently, the market cap is $5.4B on $3B GRV.

I assume the number of share will grow about 5% per year, reaching 167.24M shares by 2025. Thus, my LTPT is $1764.13/share by 2025.

So there it is. Let me know what you think. If you're nice to me, I'll share the BFPT in another post.
 
Can you expand a little on your thinking regarding growth?

Sure, I was in a hurry when I wrote that and did not have time to elaborate.

So over the 10 years global solar installation have grown at an annualized 47% rate. So as solar prices continue to reach and drop below parity prices with natural gas and coal, I expect this pace to continue. Utility solar has dominates this growth, but this has actually started to decline this last year. Meanwhile residential solar has grown 67%. The price gap between residential and utility solar is shrinking faster that utility solar cost. Thus, residential is catching up, but still has many opportunities to cut cost. Finally, SolarCity has demonstrated that it is quite competitive within the residential and commercial space. It stands to gain market share as the industry consolidates. It is also quite disciplined in cost reductions and targeting markets favorable for growth. They are perusing manufacturing their own high efficiency panels, which can cut cost and increase the capacity per installation. Including Powerwalls/packs can also increase the value per installation. Developing their microgrid service and providing other grid services from aggregated DERs provide other opportunities for long-term growth which are very hard to value at this time. So put altogether: solar is growing at 47%, residential may grow faster, and SolarCity will compete well through industry consolidation. So SolarCity should be able to hit it's million customer goal in three years and continue at a solid pace through 2025.

This is to be sure an optimistic outlook. Certainly any number of things could go wrong. This is why it is suitable for market participants to discount such an outlook. So at today's price of $55.46, the market is discounting this LTPT of $1764.13 at about 39% (= (1764.13/55.46)^(1/10.5) - 1).
 
SolarCity BFPT

So let's look at the BFPTs that follow from my LTPT of $ 1764.13 at the close of 2025. This again is based on a 50% growth rate past mid2018. Perhaps if I have the time I can work up a sensitivity analysis to this where we assume a 40% growth rate instead. But for now I think 50% is pretty good. It is the MRR, the Musk Rate of Return, the minimum revenue growth rate that keeps Elon personally invested in a company. He does own about 20% of SolarCity and could easily put that money into one of his other ventures if he thought the long term return would be greater.

PercentileImplied Discount6/12/20151/15/20166/12/20161/20/20176/30/2018
13.6338.63%$56$68$78$95$152
039.73%$52$63$72$88$143
2537.92%$59$72$82$99$156
5037.03%$63$76$87$105$166
7533.58%$83$98$111$132$201
10031.80%$96$113$126$149$222

I've include target for mid 2018 so that we can compare them with any other expectations we may have about hitting the million customer goal. Note that at this mid 2018 mark we expect $14.1B in GRV, this works out to $121.55 GRV/share assuming 116M shares. So how do we feel about median BFPT of $166 based on $121.55 of retained value? This is a price that is 1.36 times GRV. If this needs to be adjusted, we can adjust the assumed growth rate. Also note the spead from $143 to $222. Does this capture a reasonable range? If we think this range needs to be wider, we can push the LTPT date out further. This would increase the spread.

So chew on these targets. If there is anything else we may anchor or compare this to, let me know.
 
Sure, I was in a hurry when I wrote that and did not have time to elaborate.
Thanks for the details!

The way I read it, I infer that you don't think SolarCity would venture beyond the residential/commercial market space. Do you think they'd never move into utility scale installations? It would be a departure from their current model, but could be profitable if they were able to get some cheap desert land next to a gigafactory for instance...?
 
Thanks for the details!

The way I read it, I infer that you don't think SolarCity would venture beyond the residential/commercial market space. Do you think they'd never move into utility scale installations? It would be a departure from their current model, but could be profitable if they were able to get some cheap desert land next to a gigafactory for instance...?

It's certainly possible, but I don't think it is a good fit for their capabilities. They've worked hard to remove the cost of rooftop installation both residential and commercial. For example, they acquired Zep a maker of solar brackets and hardware designed for efficient installation. Additionally, they are very capable in financing. These specializations are not necessarily optimized for utility scale installations. Of course, I suspect they could get those capabilities if they wanted to, so ultimately I think it comes down to strategic vision. I wild card for SolarCity is their interest in providing microgrid services. Here they essentially act as a utility in integrating distributed energy generation, storage and loads. So the vision seems to be that energy services can all be highly distributed, but also interconnected connected. So it's a very different vision of how energy is produced and distruted.

In my own reading, I have learned that typical utility power bill can be broken down to 58% generation, 31% transmission, and 11% distribution. Often the low cost of utility generation is compared with the relatively high cost of distributed generation. However, it is very expensive to deliver remotely produced power to the end user. Consider, residential power at say 12 c/kWh. This is fairly inexpensive, but the transmission and distribution expense is about 5 c/kWh. What happens as the cost of solar and batteries shrink toward 6 c/kWh? How will utility solar compete? Utility solar would have to be 1 c/kWh or less just to make up for the cost of delivering that power. Granted the use of batteries within the grid can help drive down T&D costs, but delivery cost remains. Moreover, many of those reductions in T&D will involve storing energy close to where it is consumed. Thus, even the grid becomes more decentralized. So if the grid is becoming more decentralized, as an entrepreneur you want to be receiving end of that trend. Recall at EEI Musk said he sees solar producing about half of the world's energy and that about a third will be distributed. My impression is that he sees about twice as much distributed solar as utility solar long term. Recently trends show that growth in utility may be declining while growth in distributed solar is advancing 67%. Thus, the trend may be shifting from predominantly utility to predominantly distributed solar. We'll have to keep watching to confirm this shift, but it stands to reason that this trend would continue as the gap between residential and utility installed cost declines. So bottom line, if SolarCity can secure a 50% market share of distributed energy and this ultimately 1/3 of all energy, then SolarCity stands to capture 1/6 of the energy market. That is a pretty huge opportunity. It's an opportunity to grow at about 50% annually for over 35 years. So I'm pretty excited to see how far they can get in the next 10 years.
 
In my own reading, I have learned that typical utility power bill can be broken down to 58% generation, 31% transmission, and 11% distribution. Often the low cost of utility generation is compared with the relatively high cost of distributed generation. However, it is very expensive to deliver remotely produced power to the end user. Consider, residential power at say 12 c/kWh. This is fairly inexpensive, but the transmission and distribution expense is about 5 c/kWh. What happens as the cost of solar and batteries shrink toward 6 c/kWh? How will utility solar compete? Utility solar would have to be 1 c/kWh or less just to make up for the cost of delivering that power.
True, this is an interesting part of the analysis that didn't jump to mind for me. The real question will be how much of the power required during the night or during poor solar times will be provided by batteries and how much from the old-school grid. If storage doesn't take off in a big way (I personally think it WILL take off!), then the grid will remain integral to maintaining adequate power at all locations on the grid.
 
True, this is an interesting part of the analysis that didn't jump to mind for me. The real question will be how much of the power required during the night or during poor solar times will be provided by batteries and how much from the old-school grid. If storage doesn't take off in a big way (I personally think it WILL take off!), then the grid will remain integral to maintaining adequate power at all locations on the grid.

Right, even if battery storage does not take off, I think the objective of the utilities should be to complement distributed solar and make best use of it in the grid. So distributed solar is particularly good for matching with air conditioning loads on warm sunny days. These are the times that require the greatest capacity of grid resources. For example, transmission losses increase with the square of the load, so distribute solar not only cover part of the load, but it avoids driving up the losses in transmission. So utility solar aids in generation at these times of peak loads, but it does not minimize the stress on transmission. So apart from government mandates, I don't really see the need for utility solar to compete with distributed solar. Just because it is cheap does not cut it for me, because utilities don't need to pay to install distributed solar. All they really need to do is have solar friendly policies and pay suitable feed in tariffs. The problem of course is that the business model for most utilities is based on owning generation assess and selling power from those assets. Within this business model, distributed solar is perceived as a threat to revenue. More enlightened utilities like NRG are actively installing and financing distributed solar. This is a sensible way to recognize the long term economics of transition to solar while making a relevant business out of transitioning to this future. Coordinating demand response is another way utilities can integrate distributed solar. So utilities that focus on working with and complementing distributed solar will be in the best position to profit through this transition.

The basic risk that the utilities must watch out for is building up too much generation capacity, and this includes utility solar. Costner that the levelized cost of gas peaking plants is between 18 and 23 c/kWh. Given Tesla's price for Powerpacks, these packs can charge at 9 c/kWh or below and sell back at 18 c/kWh at a profit. So Powerpacks matched with wind, solar or existing baseload capacity is sufficient to put peaking plants out of business. So under the assumption that Tesla and others will produce these batteries at or below this $250/kWh price, The grid already sits on massive generation assets that will be impaired over the next 10 years. Utilities do not have the luxury of thinking they can continue to base their business models on power generation. The change will come whether they are prepared for it or not. So the tough question they need to ask is which generation assets truly prepare them for this transition. They may experience a generator glut, and I do not see how utility solar would serve them well under that scenario. They would do much better to develop aggregated DER capabilities.