Welcome to Tesla Motors Club
Discuss Tesla's Model S, Model 3, Model X, Model Y, Cybertruck, Roadster and More.
Register

SolarCity (SCTY)

This site may earn commission on affiliate links.
Status
Not open for further replies.
I should add, the latest ABS was only securitising a portion of the cashflows, while this new Hancock deal sells away almost all of the contracted cashflows. To boot, SolarCity is on the hook to provide all maintenance at it's own cost. This looks like a really bad deal for SolarCity shareholders.

Did solarcity ever provide a figure for Operations & Maintenance (o&m) costs? Looking at last quarter material, I can't find any.
--

Per Q42015 Shareholder letter their total install costs were $2.71/W which includes G&A costs of $0.25/W. The Hancock deal was for

  • The transaction raised $3.00 of financing per watt of solar generation capacity for SolarCity including tax equity investments, upfront rebates and prepayments; a blend of $3.24/watt for residential projects and $2.35/watt for commercial projects.
As I see it the deal brought in $0.29/W more than total costs per watt, not a huge profit but setting them on the path for cash flow positive if they keep doing deals like this. I assume maintenance is included in G&A which is more than covered by the deal. I'm not sure why you think they are "on the hook" when it is already factored into overall cost per watt.


Edited - oops read a chart wrong. Same conclusion though.
 
--

Per Q42015 Shareholder letter their total install costs were $2.71/W which includes G&A costs of $0.25/W. The Hancock deal was for

  • The transaction raised $3.00 of financing per watt of solar generation capacity for SolarCity including tax equity investments, upfront rebates and prepayments; a blend of $3.24/watt for residential projects and $2.35/watt for commercial projects.
As I see it the deal brought in $0.29/W more than total costs per watt, not a huge profit but setting them on the path for cash flow positive if they keep doing deals like this. I assume maintenance is included in G&A which is more than covered by the deal. I'm not sure why you think they are "on the hook" when it is already factored into overall cost per watt.


Edited - oops read a chart wrong. Same conclusion though.

I don't think O&M is included in G&A. O&M is 2cents/watt/year per analyst day presentation. That translates to 40cents/watt for the contracted portion. Given that G&A is shown as 25cents it can't possibly be under G&A.
 
Three issues with this analysis:

1) The O&M shouldn't be 40 cents because that's not the net present cost. You have to discount it for the fact that's in the future, so the current O&M liability per watt is perhaps 20-30 cents.

2) SCTY still owns some of the cash flow. It's a "minority" for the first 20 years and then 99% of any renewal. We don't know how much this "minority" is so we can't do an analysis on the profitability. Your analysis assumes it's 0. My guess is they've retained enough of the cash flow to cover O&M.

3) SCTY's cost per watt is dropping while the value of the system is not. In a year from now they should be able to sell the cash flows for a similar price while incurring costs down around $2.40 or so. Thus even if they are negative they will improve over time. How much is tough to say.
 
Last edited:
I don't think O&M is included in G&A. O&M is 2cents/watt/year per analyst day presentation. That translates to 40cents/watt for the contracted portion. Given that G&A is shown as 25cents it can't possibly be under G&A.

Here are some quotes from the analyst day presentation:

"So those $0.22 a watt that the company gets - the system gets, we pay some O&M expenses on that of about $0.02, and so the net value - the net cash coming in from the system is $0.20 a watt."

"So when you layer on the ITC on the Q3 economics on top of the cash flows, you still get the same $0.20 of cash flow to $0.22, less the $0.02 of O&M."

It does look like they are talking in present-value terms (not nominal terms). Seperately, that 22cents includes the comsumer 13cents plus srecs.
 
It didn't look this bad in the past when ABS deals came out because nobody knew what amount of cashflows are given out. If you look at the chart in slide-10 of Q4 presentation, you see that the debt financing goes down over time. In other words, the out years are not mortgaged out. Also, looking at Kroll report, it seems like only about 13years of cashflows will go out to ABS investors in an amortizing manner. But in this new Hancock deal it appears that ALL of the contracted cashflows go away (and the default risk is taken up by Hancock). I'm no expert at this, we can leave this comparison aside, but the math above is pretty straight forward, all coming from SolarCity directly.

This deal mentions "majority" as the only indication(that I can see) of how much cashflow goes toward Hancock. From your description it does feels like there's a pivot in strategy from "selling off" only the front years of the deal vs all 20, but that could just as easily be an indication of strong investor appetite rather than a concern. A willingness to go out 20 years and take less than 100% of the cut is stronger, no? I'd like to see how much SCTY is holding on to. I think in an ideal world(maybe very soon) they would be gaining most finance through ABS and tax equity. I'd love to see them hold on to potential windfall variable assets like SRECs.

This picture can be painted as a concern or absolutely amazing. All well and good to take the 3Q15 install cost since these are I believe past installs being securitized, however we all know install costs are drifting down toward $2.30/W, not the $2.71 in your calculations. Let's hope Radford has a large role in explaining all this in the earnings call.

These guys are losing money on every install in southeast PA right now, but in 6 months they'll be raking it in when they're up to scale and costs are limited. Hell, even the $2.50/W install cost we're at today includes an absolutely obscene customer acquisition line that will rapidly dwindle to nearly nothing.

Swap out yesterday's numbers for September's and your negligible margin balloons like crazy. Not to mention the amount "financed" is still increasing with each ABS.

Cash coming in: +$3.24/W
Cost of the system: -$2.35/W (revised 2016 goal)
O&M: -$0.02/w/year * 20 years (from analyst day presentation) = -$0.40/W (included in cost)

Profit Margin: $0.89/W or 37.9%
 
This deal mentions "majority" as the only indication(that I can see) of how much cashflow goes toward Hancock. From your description it does feels like there's a pivot in strategy from "selling off" only the front years of the deal vs all 20, but that could just as easily be an indication of strong investor appetite rather than a concern. A willingness to go out 20 years and take less than 100% of the cut is stronger, no? I'd like to see how much SCTY is holding on to. I think in an ideal world(maybe very soon) they would be gaining most finance through ABS and tax equity. I'd love to see them hold on to potential windfall variable assets like SRECs.

This picture can be painted as a concern or absolutely amazing. All well and good to take the 3Q15 install cost since these are I believe past installs being securitized, however we all know install costs are drifting down toward $2.30/W, not the $2.71 in your calculations. Let's hope Radford has a large role in explaining all this in the earnings call.

These guys are losing money on every install in southeast PA right now, but in 6 months they'll be raking it in when they're up to scale and costs are limited. Hell, even the $2.50/W install cost we're at today includes an absolutely obscene customer acquisition line that will rapidly dwindle to nearly nothing.

Swap out yesterday's numbers for September's and your negligible margin balloons like crazy. Not to mention the amount "financed" is still increasing with each ABS.

Cash coming in: +$3.24/W
Cost of the system: -$2.35/W (revised 2016 goal)
O&M: -$0.02/w/year * 20 years (from analyst day presentation) = -$0.40/W (included in cost)

Profit Margin: $0.89/W or 37.9%

Question: how did you arrive at the conclusion that O&M is included in the cost? I see no indication of it.
 
Question: how did you arrive at the conclusion that O&M is included in the cost? I see no indication of it.
I heard it on a Tesla message board. :)

Sounds like we now don't think it's included? Regardless this is a solar install and solar upkeep, we are all relatively familiar with the past/current/future costs of all components of the equation. I think we can agree that residual value of hardware(Silveo) will more than offset the average O&M costs for the duration. Perhaps not, but if they don't then energy is free and the entire capitalist structure is likely breaking down and I'll have greater concerns. Or perhaps less concerns?
 
  • Like
Reactions: gigglehertz
The circuit breaker should have just tripped. I can't see any good reason for this drop besides perhaps the MM wanting the stock where it was before the last earnings call, this quarter. It either rips above $35, or re-tests $18. This is basically the mid point.
SBenson just illustrated it perfectly for us. The inputs sitting in all the algorithms right now point to negative profits, therefore every expansion of the business is an even greater negative. If you take everything as a static data point, you'd be nuts to think this model is a good bet. In my mind I can see with relative certainty that costs are rapidly shrinking, income per install is increasing, the vlaue proposition has broad appeal, and marketshare is being maintained. Dominance of the US energy market is more of a certainty every day.

A computer doesn't care about that. What we need to predict is the date when the cost and profit lines pass quietly in the night, because the next morning those algos will go nuts.
 
  • Like
Reactions: AndreN
Admittedly I don't fully understand the financials - I don't think anyone really does - but I'm bullish on where SCTY is headed. I think things will turn positive in a big way later this year or early next.

I sold a 1/4 of my shares at $34 last week expecting the usual post-earnings tank. If the stock keeps dropping between now and then it's going to be hard to hold off buying back in.
 
Thanks for the link! I have been scouring the internet daily, I havent seen a shred of credible bad news for SCTY. Any thoughts on the steep swing down?
Well, oil looks to be tanking soon...again. I think market sentiment may be turning sour. Earning season puts investors on edge. Dollar getting stronger. Blah, blah, blah.

Regarding this cash equity deal, I expect that it's a good thing. SolarCity has been trying to move in this direction. So this could be a break through for them. We just don't have the details to do the kind analysis that Benson envisions. I suspect this is mostly commercial, and I've never seen good financials on commercial. It's got to be a lot lower cost that residential just to compete in that space. So we'll just have to wait to see what details will be forthcoming, if any.

I am hopeful that SolarCity is cracking the nut on how to grow in the small to medium business segment. It's quite underpenetrated by the whole solar industry.

The main thing that is promising about the cash equity deal is that it maximizes the cash upfront. They main problem with SolarCity's business model was that the cashflow was so excruciatingly slow, an average duration of 15 to 20 years. To have positive cashflow while growing in excess of 40% per year, you need an average duration less than a couple of years. The beauty of a solar installer having a yeildco is selling the assets and getting cash in return. The problem with a yeildco as a subsidiary is that the two entities are still related. A failure in one compromises the other. Just consider the interconnected mess of SunEdison and its two yieldcos. So SolarCity does much better to find totally independent investors to cut cash equity deals.
 
Once the model is somewhat "up on plane", then it's just ticking off expansion opportunities as the markets open up. Install costs of <$2.35/W and monetizations of $3.25/W means they can grow as much as they like and this high yield debt will be a non-issue. A few billion dollars in expansion debt means nothing when you're clearing $.90/W on installs, maintaining 35% marketshare, and most importantly.....having zero true competition in the PPA arena. That's the only thing that will allow an entity to clear 30% in solar, total dominance of an entire sector.

I'm sure I'm missing something and they won't have this easy of a time maintaining PPA dominance, but as of now I don't see how anyone can remotely catch up nationwide. At least nit until 2020 at the very earliest. It's just way to complex to expect to snap your fingers and say you're a true PPA competitor.

I think institutional algorithms will actually agree with the sentiment above, but need to see the inputs at those levels first. Fair enough. As long as install costs and installs hit their 2016 projections, we'll see a fair valuation after the election.
 
I just sat down and read the entire SolarCity annual report, all 200-some pages of it.

SolarCity's business is banking (more accurately, consumer finance). They lend people money, and then either (a) borrow money to finance that lending, or (b) sell the loans to a third party while acting as servicer. (The fact that the money is lent to buy solar panels makes very little difference to the business model, although it does help fight global warming.) They're trying every structured finance product under the sun, and I read descriptions of at least a dozen in the annual report.

They were clearly losing money on *some* of them, since they deliberately unwound some of the older ones to refinance them, even though it required paying extra fees. They're presumably making money on others.

I can't extract the interest rate spread from the annual report; the accounting is far too convoluted. The interest rate spread is the key factor determining whether a finance business is profitable. It's clear that they make very little money off of direct sales, but I can't work out what their expected return on those is either. (All the evidence is that they are not competitively priced in the direct-sales business in most areas and as a result their main business is financing.)

Because of the overly convoluted accounting, I can't model what the effect of a change in default rate would be. With a financing operation, I want to be able to say "They lend out $1 billion at 5% interest; they finance it by borrowing $1 billion at 3% interest; they can afford a 2% default rate before losing money". With SCTY, I simply can't *tell* from their published documents.

They are even more like a bank in one way: a lot of their financing is much shorter-term than their lending. Solar Bonds for 1 year financing 20-year installs. This is the basic business model of banks, but banks are subject to *bank runs*. SolarCity could collapse due to a short-term refinancing problem even if the underlying business has great interest rate spreads and is highly profitable.

The only possible interest rate spread I've managed to find is 5-year "solar bonds" at 5.75% and MyPower loans at 4.5%. Uh-oh -- that's loss-making.

Admittedly I don't fully understand the financials - I don't think anyone really does
That's why I'm invested in Tesla, which has quite nearly the most straightforward financial statements of any company I've ever looked at, and I'm not invested in SolarCity, which has some of the most opaque financial statements I've ever seen.

Tesla's risk factors are clear -- can they sell enough cars? Will they manage to have high enough quality or will warranty costs eat up profits? Will they have supply chain restrictions (shortage of lithium or whatever)? Will they manage to get Model 3 out ahead of the competition? Will they solve their communications problems? Are the competitors ever going to make a car which is a serious competitor, and if so, when? Staying on top of the latest information regarding these is easy enough.

There are some financing questions, but Tesla's not very leveraged and nearly all their borrowings are convertibles, which are going to turn into equity. The latest secured loans are at super-low interest rates.

SolarCity's risk factors are also clear -- can they keep rolling over their short-term financing? Can they get financing with a large enough spread over the cost they're charging customers? Can they continue to charge customers so much, given that they're reported to be consistently more expensive than local installers if you're paying cash? Can they compete successfully with local banks in the market for lending money to finance solar panels? Almost all the questions are financing questions and the business is much, much more highly leveraged than Tesla -- which makes sense, since their business is finance. Unfortunately, I think staying on top of information regarding these is much, much harder to do.

I've evaluated banks before, and they're really quite tricky businesses; they have a habit of looking great until they implode. If SolarCity implodes due to financing, Silevo and Zep and the installation business would still be worth some money, but the massive borrow-and-lend operation would overwhelm it, the way GE Capital nearly overwhelmed GE a few years back.

Contrast this statement in the Tesla Motors annual report:
"During the periods presented, we did not have relationships with unconsolidated entities or financial partnerships, such as entities often referred to as structured finance or special purpose entities, which would have been established for the purpose of facilitating off-balance sheet arrangements or other contractually narrow or limited purposes."

With over 200 pages of the SolarCity annual report devoted to special purpose entities (albeit many consolidated).

I actually think the Rive brothers are trying to present SolarCity accounting in an honest way, but the result is a completely incomprehensible balance sheet. I'm not saying it's a bad company, I'm saying it's an indecipherable company. I personally would want to dig through a lot more interest rate details of their contracts before I concluded that they had a money-making (or money-losing) business model. If someone has actually got those interest rate details, I'd love to hear them, but I'd understand if you considered it confidential investment information!
 
Thanks for your thoughts.

SCTY certainly does a lot of bank type stuff but I think they're more than that. Whether this is true depends on whether they're actually better at installing solar panel systems than anyone else. Anecdotal testimonies say that local installers are cheaper but I don't see how this could be true because SCTY buys in far higher volumes than local installers, they have stuff like Zep hardware to make installation easier and they have crews that install a boatload of solar with techniques that are probably as refined as they can be. I don't see any advantages that make a local installer cheaper other than maybe trying less hard for sales (lower sales costs). I suspect that a lot of the anecdotes saying local installers are cheaper come from mistakes like comparing panel cost per watt vs. the whole system cost per watt, or having one quote include maintenance/warranty while the other does not. I just don't see how a local manufacturer could make money selling systems for a price where SCTY loses money.

Then again, maybe local installers are somehow cheaper. I haven't really looked into it. If local installers are cheaper, then anyone with deep pockets could start selling PPA's and just contract local installers for the system rather than bother getting involved with manufacturing panels, training install staff etc. If this was true though, I think we'd see SCTY getting less vertically integrated rather than more. Why bother expanding capabilities that you aren't good at? Clearly SCTY thinks they have an advantage here because they are pursuing more vertical integration.

In terms of the stock price, if SCTY starts selling all their installs as asset backed securities then the profit margin is the rate they can afford to grow at without sinking deeper in debt. So if they install for $2.50/watt and sell that for $3.25/watt (30% margin) then they can grow at 30% for each cycling period without sinking deeper in debt. We can't full do the math on this yet because we don't have all the numbers, but I doubt they're there yet. In another year or two they might be making 30% margin with a 30% growth rate and then debt will stabilize.
 
Lots and lots of people get lower quotes from local installers than from SolarCity. Given what I know about the installation market, I'm certain this is mostly about markup, not about actual cost-of-labor or cost-of-materials. SolarCity is charging higher markups to cover its enormous advertising / marketing / sales costs, and its high overhead due to total geographic coverage, and quite possibly the overhead costs of the complex financing, and so on. There are actually *diseconomies* of scale in being a national installer: there are reasons why there are no national plumbing companies, no national electrician companies, no national construction companies, and so forth.

In markets where there aren't any local installers, SolarCity seems quite well-respected. And there are a surprisingly large number of those. So there's that on the upside.

If local installers are cheaper, then anyone with deep pockets could start selling PPA's and just contract local installers for the system rather than bother getting involved with manufacturing panels, training install staff etc.
Ah, but who has deep pockets? Also, if such a person went for national scale, he would probably end up having a bunch of the costs SolarCity has... But in certain local markets I suspect local people with deep pockets *are* doing exactly that. It would be worth looking for.

Banks, however, already have the overhead costs for the financing schemes. They seem averse to PPAs but there's some evidence that traditional loans and leases are gaining market share on PPAs. And the banks have an advantage over SolarCity in those.

Owning a "captive" manufacturer could be highly profitable for SolarCity, but we don't know yet. The panel manufacturing business is *highly* competitive. SolarCity will, when Silevo gets up to speed, be gaining the "manufacturer's margin" in with the "installer's margin"; it's likely that this is better than not being vertically integrated.

In terms of the stock price, if SCTY starts selling all their installs as asset backed securities then the profit margin is the rate they can afford to grow at without sinking deeper in debt. So if they install for $2.50/watt and sell that for $3.25/watt (30% margin)
Certainly. The trouble is that it is absolutely opaque (a) what their actual installation costs are, (b) what the homeowner's payments actually look like, (b) what they're selling it to the financiers for, and (c) the residual risk retained by SCTY, (d) the residual upside retained by SCTY, and (e) the residual maintenance costs SCTY is on the hook for. This is different in each deal, and I can't extract enough of it from the financial statements to really see what's going on, or to model changes in the business environment.

As examples of changes which are worth modeling: For instance, if SCTY's installation costs remain the same, but competition drives the prices they charge to homeowners down, the amount the investors will pay for new asset-backed securities will drop. Suppose grid electricity prices drop due to massive utility-scale solar installation, and homeowners with old deals find they're paying way more to SCTY than the going rate for power; these old-deal homeowners may decide to default on their panels, or demand renegotiation -- SCTY may be on the hook to give the financiers their guaranteed rate regardless, and how much impact would that have? Suppose interest rates go way up and financiers are demanding higher returns on investment? I'd like to run a number of stress-test scenarios and there just is not enough information available to tell what would happen in these scenarios.

By contrast, I've run all the equivalent scenarios for Tesla, because the information is out there.
 
  • Informative
Reactions: SBenson and gene
Status
Not open for further replies.