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Shorting Oil, Hedging Tesla

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Consider what happens when a producer has sold a contract for say $20/b. The close their contract by paying whatever the market price is. Suppose it is $15/b. So they net out $5/b.

This whole conversation about cash settlement is confusing to me, but that quote is more confusing than most.

If a producer sells a contract for $20/b (for, say, 1000 barrels), don't they close the contract by delivering 1000 barrels of oil that just came out of their well? They don't close the contract by buying someone else's oil?
 
This whole conversation about cash settlement is confusing to me, but that quote is more confusing than most.

If a producer sells a contract for $20/b (for, say, 1000 barrels), don't they close the contract by delivering 1000 barrels of oil that just came out of their well? They don't close the contract by buying someone else's oil?

Cash settlement on options is reasonably straightforward. In stock option terminology, if I sell a call option on TSLA at $700 and today was expiration with the share price settling at $793, then instead of delivering the 100 shares of TSLA that I would owe, as the seller of the option, I would owe $93/share ($9300) that would go to the owner of the option. The value of the option at expiration is delivered as cash rather than the underlying commodity.
 
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As best I can tell, in the oil market there is a futures market - one in Europe covering Brent crude and one in the US covering WTI Crude (those two benchmarks). Many / most of the other grades of oil get traded relative to Brent and WTI Crude (they're pegged to one or the other). Then at least in the US, there is an ETF "USO" that is long only, and buys WTI futures as a means of providing an investing mechanism for people that can't take physical delivery (they want to trade around the price of oil for whatever reason, but they don't want to trade actual oil). That ETF has run into problems recently - too big relative to the market (it's month to month rolling trades move the market in a big way, and in an oversupply situation in physically delivered contracts, they had to go pretty far negative to find buyers for the May contracts they were selling, so they could roll out to June and buy those contracts. They have the additional problem that their trades and trade sizes are published in advance, so there are plenty of market participants that are front running the USO trades.

Apparently, the Brent futures contracts settle in cash. As a producer of oil, you can still sell your future production (hedge) today. It's just that instead of delivering your oil to the contract owner at the contracted price, you sell your oil when you have it at whatever price the market will bear AND you receive (or pay) the value of that futures contract in cast on settlement day. In theory it works out the same (or at least close). In practice, we've been seeing what physically settled contracts can do to a market that is rapidly running out of places for oil to be put.

Anybody with actual knowledge and experience trading oil futures ETF's, or other market / commodity instruments that can chime in and correct my gross errors?
 
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The thing I really don't get get - considering how much oil there is sloshing around right now, why would any significant oil consumer pay any more than about $1/bbl? Just be like - I offer $1/bbl for 100k barrels of oil for Cushing delivery (presuming that you have a transportation mechanism from Cushing, which you should as a significant oil consumer). Withdraw the offer as we get close to the next contract expiration, and instead wait for negative prices and buy a physical delivery contract then. USO is going to have contracts they need to be rid of, which means they need a buyer.

As the refinery, between now and then, use up your onsite storage and buy the bare minimum you have to in order to keep your operation running while you search for these outrageous deals on your primary input.

Of course, if you're a refinery, then you've got the downstream problem of running out of places to store the gas and diesel you're making. And the jet fuel. I imagine the asphalt still has buyers! Which is probably why refineries are deciding to shut down rather than operate - totally reasonable choice.

BUT if you were still actually consuming oil, then be an aggressive buyer. By which, I mean really put the squeeze on producers. "Sure I'll take some oil, but I'm paying $1/bbl".
 
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For all the angst in the market, we're still consuming something like 3/4 of the oil we were using before.

And I wonder - how similar is this (ignore the virus effects) to the early days of the fall from grace for the coal industry? In those early years, did it look like this? Too many coal mines producing too much coal, and not enough electric power plants burning that coal to make electricity? That's only 12-15 years ago.

In that industry, after 10 years of "collapse", we're left with an industry that is supplying 13% of the US energy needs (from a high of ~24% - both from the link below - 2018 numbers). Consumption has fallen by 1/2 or so, but the value of the companies that produce the stuff has fallen 99%+ over the last 10-15 years (stat I bumped into years ago and remember, but don't have a link for now - could be wrong on the precise market cap value destruction).
EIA updates its U.S. energy consumption by source and sector chart - Today in Energy - U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA)

Is oil and natural gas, finally, at the front end of the market cap value destruction phase of its life? The demand destruction is going to take decades to dwindle to ~0 demand (I think not centuries or years), but the market cap value of the companies will be long gone much sooner.
 
This whole conversation about cash settlement is confusing to me, but that quote is more confusing than most.

If a producer sells a contract for $20/b (for, say, 1000 barrels), don't they close the contract by delivering 1000 barrels of oil that just came out of their well? They don't close the contract by buying someone else's oil?
These are exchange traded contracts. It doesn't matter where the oil comes from, if settlement is in physical oil; the only condition is that the oil must be of conforming quality. If settlement is by cash, no oil must be delivered whatsoever; it is simply a derivative contract based on what every price the market settles at.
 
The LNG Market Is “Imploding” | OilPrice.com

For the last couple of years, I've been predicting this. Before Covid-19, Japan/Korea price had fallen below $2/MMBtu. Now Covid-19 is making it even worse. The sad thing about the LNG situation is that was so clear that the global LNG price would be capped by the cheapest wind/solar/battery power available anywhere LNG is imported.
 
Ironically, however, the share prices of gas drillers have rebounded in recent weeks. Pittsburgh-based EQT has seen its share price double since March, for example. There are a few reasons for this. The Federal Reserve has funneled trillions of dollars into the financial sector, which has re-inflated financial assets of all types. Investors also seem to be trying to “buy the dip.”

But industry analysts are also predicting that a huge shortfall in gas production in the Permian will boost prices by next year. Goldman Sachs says that gas will jump to $3.25/MMBtu in 2021.

Shorting opportunity? If that's Goldman's horseshit estimate for 2021 gas pricing, they're in big trouble. Even the narrative isn't half enough to be profitable
 
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WTI $11/b
Brent $20/b

Does anyone know how much it costs producers to move their product to these respective markets? It would be nice to subtract this cost to see what producers are actually getting. I suspect alot of producers are faced with negative net prices at the well.
 
Usually I would chalk this up to talk, but this time sounds more serious. One more dip into negative WTI pricing might push this nutjob into action.

Trump Could Use ‘Nuclear Option’ To Make Saudi Arabia Pay For Oil War | OilPrice.com
This truly is a nuclear option

Specifically, the NOPEC Bill would make it illegal to artificially cap oil (and gas) production or to set prices, as OPEC, OPEC+, and Saudi Arabia do. The Bill would also immediately remove the sovereign immunity that presently exists in U.S. courts for OPEC as a group and for each and every one of its individual member states. This would leave Saudi Arabia open to being sued under existing U.S. anti-trust legislation, with its total liability being its estimated US$1 trillion of investments in the U.S. alone. The U.S. would then be legally entitled to freeze all Saudi bank accounts in the U.S., seize its assets in the country, and halt all use of U.S. dollars by the Saudis anywhere in the world (oil, of course, to begin with, is denominated in U.S. dollars). It would also allow the U.S. to go after Saudi Aramco and its assets and funds, as it is still a majority state-owned production and trading vehicle, and would mean that Aramco could be ordered to break itself up into smaller, constituent companies that are not deemed to break competition rules in the oil, gas, and petrochemicals sectors or to influence the oil price.

The Bill came very close indeed to being passed into law when in February of last year, the House Judiciary Committee passed the NOPEC Act, which cleared the way for a vote on the Bill before the full House of Representatives. On the same day, Democrats Patrick Leahy and Amy Klobuchar and – most remarkably – two Republicans, Chuck Grassley and Mike Lee, introduced the NOPEC Bill to the Senate. Its progress was only halted after President Trump stepped in and vetoed it when the Saudis did what he told them to do (at that point, to produce more to keep oil prices under US$70 per barrel of Brent), but the option is still available for a relatively quick turnaround on turning it into law.

By Simon Watkins for Oilprice.com
 
I don't understand how these entities can just roll out of June contracts when it's Apr 28th? Would this be what you wanted if an ETF we truly tracking WTI value?

Oil prices could go negative again for reasons beyond just storage
The Chicago Mercantile Exchange recently raised its margin requirements for forward oil contracts, which could trigger selling when key levels are reached.

S&P Dow Jones Indices said that all of its commodity indices will roll out of the June oil contract and into July, joining the United States Oil Fund which is also rolling out of the June contract.
 
I don't understand how these entities can just roll out of June contracts when it's Apr 28th? Would this be what you wanted if an ETF we truly tracking WTI value?

Oil prices could go negative again for reasons beyond just storage

In the case of USO, they've been making it plain as they change how that ETF works (5 changes in 2 weeks) that it's not a WTI tracking mechanism anymore. From what I can see, the ETF's / indices that track WTI are too large relative to the market AND WTI futures are physically settled. With those two circumstances in place, and so much excess physical oil sloshing around, I don't see how a cash settled derivative of WTI can be setup.

I guess it worked before because there were a minority of traders that really did want delivery, and there was enough of a balance between supply and demand that USO could reliably roll contracts month to month. Though from the size, I have a hard time seeing how they don't move the market a lot each month.


The problems with these tracking derivatives - I see those problems driving investor dollars out of the oil market. Maybe not immediately - we've still got people seeing $2/bbl oil prices and thinking that's gotta snap back, and then using whatever investment instrument they can find to get in on that sweet, sweet deal. At some point, people will realize that their market tracking investment instrument isn't any of those things (or at least not right now, while supply/demand are so badly out of balance).
 
For all the angst in the market, we're still consuming something like 3/4 of the oil we were using before.
The problem is that the collapse in demand happened so quickly, and concurrently with significant increases in supply, that the market hasn't had a chance to catch up. The buffer between supply and demand is storage, and it's effectively full.

Edit: And I see this as a temporary (6-12 month) phenomenon. It's not the permanent death of oil (yet).
 
Usually I would chalk this up to talk, but this time sounds more serious. One more dip into negative WTI pricing might push this nutjob into action.

Trump Could Use ‘Nuclear Option’ To Make Saudi Arabia Pay For Oil War | OilPrice.com
I think that view assumes there are no opaque financial ties b/w Saudi Arabia and citizen Trump. I don't see Trump taking any steps beyond tariffs on imported oil, which would be mischaracterized as being "paid by the Saudis." Tariffs are paid by domestic importers--refineries, in this case.
 
The problem is that the collapse in demand happened so quickly, and concurrently with significant increases in supply, that the market hasn't had a chance to catch up. The buffer between supply and demand is storage, and it's effectively full.

Edit: And I see this as a temporary (6-12 month) phenomenon. It's not the permanent death of oil (yet).

The extreme supply glut - I agree that's temporary, and I think the 6-12 month range doesn't sound unreasonable. But balance as the oil companies and nations normally think of - I don't think that's coming back.

The question for me, is what does "the permanent death of oil mean"? If we're thinking that worldwide demand for oil is heading rapidly to 0, I agree we're not there yet. But if we're talking about the financial valuation of companies in that business - I think we ARE starting in on that.


I find that I like the coal industry for a mental model of how this is going to progress.

We're at 70 or 80% of the previous market size in terms of demand. I doubt that bounces all the way back, but 90%? That doesn't sound unreasonable to me, and that is probably enough demand along with a first wave of bankruptcies and pain (and workers leaving the industry for something else), to bring back something like supply / demand balance.

That's a raw consumption point of view. The price of oil - I don't see that going back to $60/bbl. Maybe a brief spike, but as long as there are producers in the world that can make money on marginal oil at $20-30, I think this is closer to where we'll be at. Maybe $40.

So on the financial valuation side for private / public companies (as opposed to national oil co's / countries), I see the company valuations being hit hard. The coal sector is instructive - we've transitioned from a variety of public companies in the mid 00's, to a series of private companies that have improved efficiency a lot, but aren't considered good investments by the market (lending money for instance). They can get minor amounts of financing, and are effectively as valuable to their owners as the dividends they can produce. But they're pretty much out of the new coal mine building / investment business, and are into the monetize existing assets business.

And their share of the market is shrinking (24 down to 13% as of 2018). The company valuations have been effectively destroyed.


That's what I see coming to the US O&G industry. Over the next 10 years or so (say 5-20), the companies will go private (probably via bankruptcy), and will steadily convert to companies that are monetizing existing assets rather than spending significantly on new assets. The owners of those companies will be looking at their cash generation as the basis for pricing the companies (not future assets and their cash generation - primarily looking at the cash that can be generated from effectively free assets). The financial industry will have moved on from financing big capital projects in the sector (maybe to renewable energy projects, but maybe other stuff).

Energy stlll needs a lot of investment, so renewable energy and related projects (electric grid for instance) are an obvious source for new investments.


And 10 years from now, US consumption of O&G will still be 60% of today's consumption (I'm making that up, based roughly on how coal demand has been shrinking). The total demand will be a high fraction of today's demand, but the financial value of the companies providing a little or a lot of that demand will be ~0 (a rounding error compared to today's valuations).

This is the problem with capital intense industries - when demand is high and capital utilization is high, a marginal unit of demand creates a lot of incremental profit.

Meanwhile, a marginal negative unit of demand has an outsized impact on profit (moving into loss).

As an interesting sidebar, this is one of the problems tied up with the others, that I see facing the auto industry as a whole, in the transition to EV's. Small reductions in demand for their current products hit the bottom line in an outsized fashion.
 
World’s Largest Oil Fund Is Once Again Crashing Crude Markets | OilPrice.com

USO is pulling all of it's investments in the front month WTI crude futures out. It's not clear to me if this is the 6th change in investment strategy of the last couple weeks, or still part of the 5th. One consequence is that USO now has 0% investment in the thing that it was originally formed to invest in and track.

This has the benefit (as I see it) of spreading out it's footprint in the larger market, and eliminate the near month gyrations associated with moving contracts month to month (seems like a good thing to me). There will still be monthly rolls, but they'll be spread out over 4+ expirations, with some of the new expirations already owned, so there will be a smaller slice of the overall fund being moved each month.
 
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For Oil and Its Dependents, It’s Code Blue - Resilience

Terry Lynn Karl, in her book The Paradox of Plenty about the nature of petro-states, reaches back 500 years for a cautionary tale for any fossil fuel exporting state today.

The Spanish Crown pinned all of its hopes on one volatile commodity, gold.

Between 1503 and 1595, Spain emptied the Americas of its gold and silver to enrich the Crown’s coffers. This one crop economy depended on the enslavement and murder of Indigenous people. Both gold and its slave workforce were a finite resource.

But the unnatural resource boom allowed Spain to “live outside the natural order.”

Drunk on bullion, the Spanish Crown didn’t save. It didn’t manufacture. It imported most everything, and refused to diversify. Gold, it thought, would answer every prayer and solve every problem. The nation’s ruling class became fat, entitled and blind.

And when Spain started to run out of revenue before the flow of gold dried up, it just lived on debt like most every modern petro state, thinking there would always be another boom.

Between 1557 and 1680, proud Spain declared bankruptcy every 20 years as regular as clockwork.

Then Spain’s economy deteriorated and its state fell into disorganization. The regime decayed as debt, unemployment, inflation and an outbreak of the plague underscored its fragility.

Spain became one of Europe’s poorest countries.