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Russia/Ukraine conflict

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I've been thinking about how mobilization affects the economy of a country. I've found some papers on how regular conscription hurts an economy. Countries that have mandatory military service tend to see about a 1/2% hit to GDP over countries that only have voluntary military service. But I haven't found anything that enumerates what happens to an economy with full wartime conscription.

Peacetime conscription of young people creates a net drag on the economy, but one that is manageable. Larger scale conscription in wartime is going to have a much greater effect on the economy. If a large percentage of those who are mobilized get seriously wounded or killed, the drag on the economy is going to last for a generation or more.

An extreme example of this is the Paraguayan War of 1864-1870. It's estimated Paraguay lost 90% of their men and 2/3 of their entire population during the war. The country still hasn't fully recovered. That is probably the most devastating loss for a nation in modern history and it's unlikely to be repeated.

Pundits like to talk about Russia's larger population and larger industrial base than Ukraine has. This is a bit misleading. The Russian population is 3X the size of Ukraine, but Ukraine has a number of leveling factors. Defending their homeland and Russia being the aggressor is the most obvious one.

A less obvious advantage is the war economies of the two countries. Ukraine is getting substantial help from outside the country. A lot of their industry was in parts of the country that took a lot of damage like Mariupol or Kharkhiv and are either in Russian hands now, or are running at minimal levels due to the war. But because of the outside help Ukraine only needs to keep its economy ticking over enough to keep the troops in the field and keep the domestic population alive.

There are rumors China is helping Russia and they probably are to some degree, but for the most part Russia is paying its own way in this war. It has gotten some ammunition from other countries, but mostly it's dependent on domestic production. They have drawn down their reserve pools to keep equipment in the field, but other than that, they need to make their own. Additionally Russia needs to try and keep their export economy going as much as possible to keep currency flowing in.

Russia needs a lot more civilian workers than Ukraine does. There is a much larger civilian population that needs to be kept alive, they need their defense industries running at peak output, and they have a much more complex transportation problem than Ukraine has. The factories making war goods in Russia are mostly in the central and eastern parts of the country and Russia needs to move all those supplies from the factories to the front on their own. The factories making war goods for Ukraine, or depots supplying material are mostly further away, but Ukraine's allies are footing the bill of getting the stuff to Ukraine's border and then Ukraine just needs to make a shorter haul than Russia to get it to the front.

Russia also doesn't show any signs of utilizing people not eligible for mobilization to fill jobs left vacant by conscription like the US and Commonwealth countries did in the world wars and which Ukraine is doing now. (This is mostly women.)

As Russia draws on their working age male population to serve as cannon fodder in Ukraine, the jobs those people were doing back home aren't getting done. That creates a bigger and bigger drag on the entire economy. If a significant number of those end up dead or maimed, that hit is going to continue to impact the Russian economy for years to come. Especially if this war ends in a way that leaves Russia a pariah state few want to do business with.

I strongly doubt Russia is going to lose anywhere near the losses Paraguay suffered, but Russia could be looking at economic damage that lasts a very long time and it may never fully recover.

If Russia draws too heavily on their working age male population, the wheels will fall off the economy and who knows what will happen to the country.

Ukraine can afford to draw on a much larger percentage of their working age population (and they are taking a fairly high number of women too) and survive because of the outside help.

Russia really doesn't have a population advantage over Ukraine. It's struggling tremendously to keep a poorly equipped army in the field right now. Intercepted phone calls talk about all things being in short supply: weapons, ammunition, food, warm weather clothing, etc. Additionally the training for mobiks is terrible. The troops they held back for training in the first round of mobilization got some training, but it was pretty poor by western standards.

If they were to try and grow their force in Ukraine, that would likely make their supply problems worse. But even if they are able to keep the same size force going, they will continue to have to tap the working age male population and that will deteriorate the home economy. The phrase "robbing Peter to pay Paul" is the dilemma they are faced with.

Russia has not tapped a significant portion of their working age population yet. According to World Bank data, about 2/3 of Russia's population is age 15-64.
Population ages 15-64 (% of total population) - Russian Federation | Data

That would be about 46 million men. However, in Russia a much higher number of those are on the older end and a bit over 20 million are under 40.
Russia: men and women by age 2022 | Statista

Between emigration and mobilization so far in this war, 1-2 million are now out of the Russian workforce. That could be as high as 10%. Among those who emigrated are a lot of well educated workers who were doing the more complex work of their society.

When I look at these impacts on Russia's economy that the Ukrainians aren't suffering as badly, it becomes a peer to peer manpower fight at best for Russia. As the aggressor Russia has no hope of winning a peer to peer fight. The only time an attacking country could hope to win a peer to peer fight is if there was a big technological advantage on the part of the attacking country (as was seen in many colonial battles during the Age of Exploration or the Russian expansion across Asia). Between adversaries that are close in technological capabilities, the aggressor has no hope of winning unless they can bring a lot more troops and material to the fight. Something Russia is incapable of doing.

If western aid dried up tomorrow, Ukraine would fight on with whatever they had. The war would be long, Russia might be able to gain some ground, but the Ukrainians would switch over to insurgency tactics and in modern history outside powers trying to put down an insurgency have almost always lost (I can only think of one win, the UK in Malay late 1940s). The US has lost three of them and it has vastly more military resources than Russia.

At this point there is no feasible scenario where Russia could win this war. There are scenarios where Ukraine is left pretty much destroyed and on its back, but Russia still wouldn't win.
 
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Artillery losses continue at rates faster than we'd seen prior to Feb 2023. Deep strikes into Ukrainian lands occupied by orcs continue. Numbers are showing an interesting change in the tactics used by Ukraine and the continued losses by Russia.

Wartranslated.com posted a video of a mechanized unit crossing the urals and heading West. Plenty of trucks and over 20 APCs of various sorts. No tanks. Only 1 fuel tanker. 20 APCs would eat 2000 gallons of diesel a day I'd think, plus the 2000 a day for the trucks and that's not doing much. I fuel tanker is not going to suffice but in the urbanized Donbass there are plenty of roads to bring regular semi trucks very close to staging points.

We had discussed the increased artillery losses earlier and it does seem likely that some of it is simply russia being forced to use towed artillery as we're seeing more videos of towed pieces targeted with drones spotting. This will be quite impactful for russia. it forces a drastic change in tactics as the artillery can't move forward to support, in the rare event they achieved a breakthrough, in the spring mud season.
 

Hopefully that works, towed artillery not doing the shoot and scoot instead opting for stuck and didn’t duck

At the start of the war Russia had about 2200 SP artillery active with over 3800 claimed in reserve. A lot of their reserve was probably not recoverable because they had burned out barrels from the Chechen wars and they never bothered to repair them. Some of the reserve was probably recoverable though.

They had about 1150 towed artillery active and about 1000 mortars active. The reserves for mortars was about 4000 and about 5600 gun artillery.

Ukraine has claimed to have taken out around 2400 gun artillery pieces. Most of that was SP artillery early in the war and towed more recently.

We're rarely seeing any SP artillery on the field. Almost all Russian artillery is towed now. Also I haven't seen many trucks in the drone videos of towed artillery. They are probably so short on trucks they can't dedicate one truck per towed piece like most militaries which leaves those guns sitting ducks if anyone finds them. A lighter artillery piece like a 75mm gun can be manhandled by the crew to move it slowly, but a 152mm gun can only be moved with a vehicle.

Russia may have lost around 2400 guns to the Ukrainians, but they have probably lost far more than that to wear and tear. If all we're seeing are towed guns these days that is an indication that 6000 Russian SP guns are effectively lost. A lot may be sitting in a storage depot somewhere with a burned out barrel, but since they aren't making many new barrels, those guns are effectively lost until they can manufacture new guns.

Before the war Russian artillerymen had complained that the steel used in newer guns was inferior to that used in Soviet era guns. I would not be surprised if the Soviets primary gun barrel maker was in Ukraine or another republic that broke away from Russia. Advanced metallurgy is almost sort of an art form than a science. Some isolated places can do it well, but it's hard to reproduce in other places.

Between burning through their Soviet stocks of artillery ammunition and their inability to make good barrels, Russia may be effectively done as an artillery power. Shocking considering their heavy reliance on artillery up to now.

I wonder how many of the towed guns in active service and the reserves have been lost and rendered unusable? It's harder to tell because a given piece seen in a drone video may have been in active service at the start of the war, or may have been pulled from reserves.
 
The U.S. today announced the latest package of $400M in military aid to Ukraine.

This includes:

-HIMARS artillery rockets
-howitzers
-tactical bridges
-ammunition for Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles
-demolitions munitions and equipment
-other maintenance, training, and support

This helps to confirm Ukraine’s anticipated Spring/Summer offensive remains on schedule.

Ukraine war: US sends Kyiv more ammunition amid fears stocks running short
 
At the start of the war Russia had about 2200 SP artillery active with over 3800 claimed in reserve. A lot of their reserve was probably not recoverable because they had burned out barrels from the Chechen wars and they never bothered to repair them. Some of the reserve was probably recoverable though.

They had about 1150 towed artillery active and about 1000 mortars active. The reserves for mortars was about 4000 and about 5600 gun artillery.

Ukraine has claimed to have taken out around 2400 gun artillery pieces. Most of that was SP artillery early in the war and towed more recently.

We're rarely seeing any SP artillery on the field. Almost all Russian artillery is towed now. Also I haven't seen many trucks in the drone videos of towed artillery. They are probably so short on trucks they can't dedicate one truck per towed piece like most militaries which leaves those guns sitting ducks if anyone finds them. A lighter artillery piece like a 75mm gun can be manhandled by the crew to move it slowly, but a 152mm gun can only be moved with a vehicle.

Russia may have lost around 2400 guns to the Ukrainians, but they have probably lost far more than that to wear and tear. If all we're seeing are towed guns these days that is an indication that 6000 Russian SP guns are effectively lost. A lot may be sitting in a storage depot somewhere with a burned out barrel, but since they aren't making many new barrels, those guns are effectively lost until they can manufacture new guns.

Before the war Russian artillerymen had complained that the steel used in newer guns was inferior to that used in Soviet era guns. I would not be surprised if the Soviets primary gun barrel maker was in Ukraine or another republic that broke away from Russia. Advanced metallurgy is almost sort of an art form than a science. Some isolated places can do it well, but it's hard to reproduce in other places.

Between burning through their Soviet stocks of artillery ammunition and their inability to make good barrels, Russia may be effectively done as an artillery power. Shocking considering their heavy reliance on artillery up to now.

I wonder how many of the towed guns in active service and the reserves have been lost and rendered unusable? It's harder to tell because a given piece seen in a drone video may have been in active service at the start of the war, or may have been pulled from reserves.
Think you have that exactly correct. I like the concentration on artillery because at some point that’s going to impact operations if the war can become one of mobility. I have seen a few SP units taken out recently but not many.

Those forward deployed assets will be lost if Ukraine can achieve localized break throughs.
 
Think you have that exactly correct. I like the concentration on artillery because at some point that’s going to impact operations if the war can become one of mobility. I have seen a few SP units taken out recently but not many.

Those forward deployed assets will be lost if Ukraine can achieve localized break throughs.

The only arm of the Russian army that was able to accomplish anything in the last year (after the initial surprise) was the artillery. They were able to pummel the Ukrainians so hard they had to yield. But the barrages were some of the most concentrated barrages in history.

If the artillery arm fails, the Russian army will be left in a very bad place.

I agree that if the Russians are mostly using towed artillery, that will quickly get overrun when the Ukrainians achieve breakthrough with highly mobile units.

This is also kind of confusing. The Russians appear to be putting a lot of effort into fortifying at least one beach in Crimea. Nobody is going to conduct an amphibious invasion of Crimea. Ukraine doesn't have the navy to do it and the USN is not going to.

If the Russians want to waste resources building useless fortifications, go ahead. Maybe they should pour resources into fortifying Vladivostok too?
 
I guess it is the narrow beach that juts out into the Black Sea but is within attack range of the Ukrainians. Ukraine keeps trying to land troops there , if they could it would be a problem for Russia

Sometimes place names in Ukraine are repeated, which can lead to confusion, but the only Yevpatoria I can find is halfway down the western shore of the Crimean Peninsula. It's over 100 miles from Kheson, the nearest held Ukrainian city.

Somebody found the trenches on satellite images. It is the city in Crimea.

Whoever ordered those built is insane. Ukraine has some short range river boats suitable for cross river raids in the Kherson region. To attack that beach in Crimea would require a full blown amphibious navy like the USN has.

Russian news goes on about war with NATO being imminent because that's what they need to tell the domestic audience so they believe there is an existential threat to support the war. But anyone who has any position of rank in the army should be capable of realizing it's just scare tactics to keep the public in line and is not a real threat.

Additionally if the US was organizing for an amphibious invasion, there would be significant activity at the naval bases where the amphibious forces are based, Marines would be getting refresher training on amphibious operations, and other activity would be going on that would be impossible to hide. Even by late in WW II when the Japanese intelligence capabilities were badly degraded and the US media was far more locked down than it is now, the Japanese always knew when the US was going to do another invasion. They couldn't tell where it was going to happen, but they would know when one was imminent.
 
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I've been thinking about how mobilization affects the economy of a country. I've found some papers on how regular conscription hurts an economy. Countries that have mandatory military service tend to see about a 1/2% hit to GDP over countries that only have voluntary military service. But I haven't found anything that enumerates what happens to an economy with full wartime conscription.

Peacetime conscription of young people creates a net drag on the economy, but one that is manageable. Larger scale conscription in wartime is going to have a much greater effect on the economy. If a large percentage of those who are mobilized get seriously wounded or killed, the drag on the economy is going to last for a generation or more.

An extreme example of this is the Paraguayan War of 1864-1870. It's estimated Paraguay lost 90% of their men and 2/3 of their entire population during the war. The country still hasn't fully recovered. That is probably the most devastating loss for a nation in modern history and it's unlikely to be repeated.

Pundits like to talk about Russia's larger population and larger industrial base than Ukraine has. This is a bit misleading. The Russian population is 3X the size of Ukraine, but Ukraine has a number of leveling factors. Defending their homeland and Russia being the aggressor is the most obvious one.

A less obvious advantage is the war economies of the two countries. Ukraine is getting substantial help from outside the country. A lot of their industry was in parts of the country that took a lot of damage like Mariupol or Kharkhiv and are either in Russian hands now, or are running at minimal levels due to the war. But because of the outside help Ukraine only needs to keep its economy ticking over enough to keep the troops in the field and keep the domestic population alive.

There are rumors China is helping Russia and they probably are to some degree, but for the most part Russia is paying its own way in this war. It has gotten some ammunition from other countries, but mostly it's dependent on domestic production. They have drawn down their reserve pools to keep equipment in the field, but other than that, they need to make their own. Additionally Russia needs to try and keep their export economy going as much as possible to keep currency flowing in.

Russia needs a lot more civilian workers than Ukraine does. There is a much larger civilian population that needs to be kept alive, they need their defense industries running at peak output, and they have a much more complex transportation problem than Ukraine has. The factories making war goods in Russia are mostly in the central and eastern parts of the country and Russia needs to move all those supplies from the factories to the front on their own. The factories making war goods for Ukraine, or depots supplying material are mostly further away, but Ukraine's allies are footing the bill of getting the stuff to Ukraine's border and then Ukraine just needs to make a shorter haul than Russia to get it to the front.

Russia also doesn't show any signs of utilizing people not eligible for mobilization to fill jobs left vacant by conscription like the US and Commonwealth countries did in the world wars and which Ukraine is doing now. (This is mostly women.)

As Russia draws on their working age male population to serve as cannon fodder in Ukraine, the jobs those people were doing back home aren't getting done. That creates a bigger and bigger drag on the entire economy. If a significant number of those end up dead or maimed, that hit is going to continue to impact the Russian economy for years to come. Especially if this war ends in a way that leaves Russia a pariah state few want to do business with.

I strongly doubt Russia is going to lose anywhere near the losses Paraguay suffered, but Russia could be looking at economic damage that lasts a very long time and it may never fully recover.

If Russia draws too heavily on their working age male population, the wheels will fall off the economy and who knows what will happen to the country.

Ukraine can afford to draw on a much larger percentage of their working age population (and they are taking a fairly high number of women too) and survive because of the outside help.

Russia really doesn't have a population advantage over Ukraine. It's struggling tremendously to keep a poorly equipped army in the field right now. Intercepted phone calls talk about all things being in short supply: weapons, ammunition, food, warm weather clothing, etc. Additionally the training for mobiks is terrible. The troops they held back for training in the first round of mobilization got some training, but it was pretty poor by western standards.

If they were to try and grow their force in Ukraine, that would likely make their supply problems worse. But even if they are able to keep the same size force going, they will continue to have to tap the working age male population and that will deteriorate the home economy. The phrase "robbing Peter to pay Paul" is the dilemma they are faced with.

Russia has not tapped a significant portion of their working age population yet. According to World Bank data, about 2/3 of Russia's population is age 15-64.
Population ages 15-64 (% of total population) - Russian Federation | Data

That would be about 46 million men. However, in Russia a much higher number of those are on the older end and a bit over 20 million are under 40.
Russia: men and women by age 2022 | Statista

Between emigration and mobilization so far in this war, 1-2 million are now out of the Russian workforce. That could be as high as 10%. Among those who emigrated are a lot of well educated workers who were doing the more complex work of their society.

When I look at these impacts on Russia's economy that the Ukrainians aren't suffering as badly, it becomes a peer to peer manpower fight at best for Russia. As the aggressor Russia has no hope of winning a peer to peer fight. The only time an attacking country could hope to win a peer to peer fight is if there was a big technological advantage on the part of the attacking country (as was seen in many colonial battles during the Age of Exploration or the Russian expansion across Asia). Between adversaries that are close in technological capabilities, the aggressor has no hope of winning unless they can bring a lot more troops and material to the fight. Something Russia is incapable of doing.

If western aid dried up tomorrow, Ukraine would fight on with whatever they had. The war would be long, Russia might be able to gain some ground, but the Ukrainians would switch over to insurgency tactics and in modern history outside powers trying to put down an insurgency have almost always lost (I can only think of one win, the UK in Malay late 1940s). The US has lost three of them and it has vastly more military resources than Russia.

At this point there is no feasible scenario where Russia could win this war. There are scenarios where Ukraine is left pretty much destroyed and on its back, but Russia still wouldn't win.
When considering available workforce and military conscription capacity it is necessary to understand physical reality. Russian male life expectancy was 67.62 years in 2021;according to Worldometers, ranking at 113 in the World. As several of us have noted Russian male health is very poor, exacerbated by vodka, poor diet, poor living conditions and poor education. Looks are deceptive since those conditions are primarily most visible precisely where military enlisted resources are, NOT in Moscow and Saint Petersburg. That really means the situation is worse than it looks.

When Wagner/military disputes have become open and public, as they have, we’re poised fir unexpected consequences. Bakhmut or any other development , including a column of tanks decimated, pales when considering how delicate internal Russian conditions have become.
 
The only arm of the Russian army that was able to accomplish anything in the last year (after the initial surprise) was the artillery. They were able to pummel the Ukrainians so hard they had to yield. But the barrages were some of the most concentrated barrages in history.

If the artillery arm fails, the Russian army will be left in a very bad place.

I agree that if the Russians are mostly using towed artillery, that will quickly get overrun when the Ukrainians achieve breakthrough with highly mobile units.

This is also kind of confusing. The Russians appear to be putting a lot of effort into fortifying at least one beach in Crimea. Nobody is going to conduct an amphibious invasion of Crimea. Ukraine doesn't have the navy to do it and the USN is not going to.

If the Russians want to waste resources building useless fortifications, go ahead. Maybe they should pour resources into fortifying Vladivostok too?
Nah, it's just a tourist attraction. New boardwalks - check out that amazing view of the beach! Why is it walled and dug in? Well, it just keeps sensitive tourists protected from the wind.

😏

</humor> - Only thing I can think of is that Ukraine has gotten into their heads and they think U might be crazy enough to launch an amphibious assault, or they're swallowing some planted false intelligence... Seems strange otherwise.

Edit: or, as @wdolson says, they're swallowing their own propaganda and actually believe NATO is going to put boots on the ground. Hmm, maybe it's a make-work project to keep the solders there from getting bored, and/or stimulate the local economy since tourism will definitely be taking a massive hit this year.
 
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This re Russian AFV production may be of interest - looks like only T62 and BMP being refurbed now

 
the UK would supply Ukraine not 14 Challenger 2 tanks, but 28, and also increase the number of Ukrainian personnel who will be trained in the country this year by 2.5 times.


(at this rate one can envisage a UK-UKR joint venture to manufacture Challenger 3 in Ukraine in the future, i.e. new hulls etc)
 
When considering available workforce and military conscription capacity it is necessary to understand physical reality. Russian male life expectancy was 67.62 years in 2021;according to Worldometers, ranking at 113 in the World. As several of us have noted Russian male health is very poor, exacerbated by vodka, poor diet, poor living conditions and poor education. Looks are deceptive since those conditions are primarily most visible precisely where military enlisted resources are, NOT in Moscow and Saint Petersburg. That really means the situation is worse than it looks.

When Wagner/military disputes have become open and public, as they have, we’re poised fir unexpected consequences. Bakhmut or any other development , including a column of tanks decimated, pales when considering how delicate internal Russian conditions have become.

Many months ago Kamil Galeev had a thread about how, even before the war, the Russians had gutted the country to keep the capital looking nice. There was always a degree to that. The shops in Moscow were better stocked in the communist era to a point where people who lived less than a day's train ride from Moscow would ride the train into Moscow for supplies.

Galeev also pointed out that Archangel used to be a nice city, but he showed a contemporary picture. The roads have turned to muddy messes as a couple of decades of winter weather with no repair has broken up all the asphalt. The building have declined too.

I have a friend who was a Geophysicist at Marathon Oil for most of his career. One of his friends was sent to help the Russians on an oil project in Siberia. He saw how Russians lived outside of Moscow getting there and he said most Russians lived in third world conditions. The new town that had sprung up to support the oil project was mostly pre-fab buildings and he said they had inside plumbing, but they hadn't understood the concept of a U bend, so all the buildings smelled of raw sewage inside.

The fortunes of ordinary Russians is on decline. They are putting up with it hoping it results in something better for Russia, but there are signs the people are beginning to realize the war is lost.

This re Russian AFV production may be of interest - looks like only T62 and BMP being refurbed now


Very interesting. They are probably pulling T-62s out of storage and trying to make working tanks by mixing and matching parts. Probably half those T-62s being delivered to the re-manufacturing centers are just being broken down for parts. If there is a common part that can't be manufactured new that is broken on a lot of tanks, they are probably making even fewer working tanks with more hulks for parts.

Another problem for Russia, the T-62 does not have an auto-loader. It normally requires a crew of 4 (driver, commander, gunner, and loader). By last summer they were so short on tank crews they were sending tanks out into combat with a crew of two instead of three. That makes the tank vastly less efficient because the commander has to serve as gunner too. If the commander has to be loader, commander, and gunner on the T-62s, they are effectively useless. If the Russians were smart, they would be taking some of the artillery men from the artillery units being disbanded and shunt them into the tank corps. The skills to be a tank gunner are different, but an artillery loader should be retrainable as a tank loader fairly easily. Though the only evidence I've seen with disbanded artillery units is to shunt them into the infantry where all their trained skills are useless.

From the thread is sounds like most of the BMPs being refurbished are BMP-3s which are Russia's best APV available in quantity.I have read that BMP-1s have been seen in larger numbers on the battlefield. Those were mostly retired from service at the start of the war.

I've also read that the T-90s being built new are being completed with most of the advanced equipment missing. They are essentially T-72s with some window dressing.
 
Why aren’t there reinforcements or increased artillery/drone backups for Ukraine in Bbakhmut?

For Ukraine Bakhmut is a shaping operation. Ukraine is only holding out there as long as they can inflict high casualties on the Russians without taking large casualties themselves. Ukraine has never been wedded to holding Bakhmut at all costs. They see that the overall war has bigger objectives.

Bakhmut has dominated the news because it's the only sector of the front with heavy fighting. Ukraine is looking at the bigger picture and is planning an offensive for somewhere else that will be more productive. The two big areas where a Ukrainian offensive would have impact would be in the north end up the Donbas and in the line of southern contact where Voledar is in the center of the line.

The Donbas is easy terrain to defend along an east-west axis. There are many hills and valleys that are all running north-south. If you lose a town, you can drop back to the hills outside of town a build a new defensive line. This is why the war in the Donbas was bogged down for 8 years after 2014. Nobody would gain much initiative against the other e-w.

A collapse of defenses along the northern edge of the Donbas could be catastrophic for the Russians because defending n-s is very difficult because of the same terrain features. An attacking force could move along the ridges and rain artillery fire down on any concentrations of troops in the valleys. With the attackers moving along the grain of the valleys the rivers in those valleys are no defense and could be a hindrance as getting troops from one side of the river to the other to plug gaps is more difficult.

The Ukrainians could give up Bakhmut now and then retake it for free when the Russians flee in panic with a Ukrainain offensive threatening to cut them off from the rear.

An offensive in the south would allow the Ukrainians to push their front line to the Azoz shore. That would cause a massive supply problem for Russia, especially now that a span of the Kerch rail bridge has been removed. The whole southern front becomes dependent on what the Russians can move by ship to Crimea. With the Ukrainians on the north shore of the Azoz, the Ukrainians can cut off the ferries on the Azoz forcing the Russians to move supplies with their amphibious landing ships to ports like Sevastopol. The ferries designed for inland sea traffic may not be suitable for running in the Black Sea. Even if they are they have a much longer run to Sevastopol which means less cargo per day by a factor that could be by a huge factor. The run those ferries are making today are only a km or so. The run to Sevastopol would probably take an entire day round trip. Sevastopol also doesn't have the roll off ferry terminal the Russians have been using on the Azoz so unloading will be more complex.

Russia has been having a serious supply problem in the south since the Kerch bridge attack. Shutting down ferry service on the Azoz and cutting the supply route through southern Ukraine would be devastating. After getting to the Azoz if the Ukrainians turned westward the could probably roll up the remaining part of Kherson oblast in a few weeks as the ability to defend the region between Crimea and Kherson city would become almost impossible with low supply.

The Russian might be able to hold the points where Crimea connects to the mainland because those are choke points. Even with low supply defending a small area can be relatively easy. On the other hand Ukraine could roll up their artillery and pound all Russian defensive positions until they are degraded badly, then roll in. It depends on the quality of Russian fortifications.

For the Ukrainians the question is why put a lot of people at risk for a city that is helpful to hold, but has little strategic value when the resources can be put into larger scale operations that would probably result in your troops taking back that city with no loses when the enemy retreats.