I think that depends on the structure of the Carbon fees in AB32. The net cost to go from ~20% renewables to ~33% renewables might be greater than the Carbon fees being levied in emitters.
On the other hand, if the cost of Carbon credits was greater than the cost to build additional renewable infrastructure, then rate payers would get back more from the Carbon fees via the CPUC than their bills would increase by the additional cost of generation. I'm not sure if this is the case, but it certainly provides incentive for companies to reduce Carbon emissions.
My guess is that the cost of Carbon fees has to at least be close to the cost of new generation, and it's most effective if it's more than the cost of renewable generation.
In addition, the credit for households is the same regardless of how much electricity they use, so frugal households would likely see a net benefit even if the increased cost of renewable generation in the aggregate was greater than the Carbon fees.
It's a bit convoluted, but it's essentially compensation for an externalized cost that is distributed evenly among the households in the "Commons", and the net effect is that the cost of additional renewable generation will be apportioned based on a household's electricity use. Households that use more electricity will pay a proportionally greater share of the cost to transition to more renewables.